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We use data of neighborhoods of Bogotá to assess the causal relation between adolescent 
fertility  and  homicide  rates.  We  find  that  increases  in  the  secondary  school  enrollment 
always  reduce  the  homicide  rates,  but  low  secondary  school  coverage  alone  does  not 
constitute  a  channel  through  which  higher  adolescent  fertility  rates  would  increase  the 
chance to have higher homicide rates in the future. On the contrary, the concurrence of a 
criminal  environment  and  high  adolescent  fertility  rates  significantly  increase  future 
homicide rates either with or without the concurrence of low access to secondary schooling. 
Furthermore, all of the direct effect of high adolescent fertility rates is lost when we control 
for  its  concurrence  with  criminal  environments.  The  results  are  robust  to  various 
specifications,  including  measurement  error  corrections,  and  the  modeling  of  the  spatial 
autocorrelation of homicides. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Colombia is one of the countries in Latina America and the Caribbean with homicide rates 
among the highest in the region, with more than 50 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, during 
most of the last 25 years, while in countries like Argentina, Chile and Uruguay it has been 
below 10, and only followed closely by El Salvador and Guatemala.
1 Colombian cities are as 
well among the most violent of the region, with homicide rates in Medellín and Cali, its most 
violent cities, that often go beyond 100 murders per 100,000 in habitants, while cities like 
Santiago and Buenos Aires have usually been below 10 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.
2 
While violence in rural Colombia has been substantially reduced, its most violent cities 
hardly observe homicide rates below 30 murders per  100,000 inhabitants, evidencing the 
structural effects of the presence of organized crime. 
 
The high and persistent levels of crime have taken place under an increasing trend of 
adolescent fertility rates in the country, which have grown constantly from 9. 5 percent in 
1990, to 16.2 in 2005.
3 As previous Colombian literature affirms that Colombian violence 
has been highly promoted by the drug business, the international literature has emphasized 
the causal link between children born from adolescent mothers and their future propensity to 
get involved in crime.
4 Since the most violent cities of the country have developed a criminal 
structure that is highly embedded in those cities, it becomes relevant to study whether the ir 
high adolescent fertility rates are b eing complementary to the means of those criminal 
structures, facilitating the pursuit of their goals, and preventing the incorporation of many of 
youths in those cities to their formal economy. 
 
In this paper we assess  the causal link between adolescent fertility and crime using cross 
section and longitudinal data of Bogotá at the neighborhood level. We find that when there 
are neighborhoods with adolescent fertility rates, that also have low secondary enrollment 
rates and relatively high crime rates, their future homicide rates become significantly higher 
than that of neighborhoods without the concurrence of those characteristics. The result is 
consistent  with  abundant  anecdotic  evidence  according  to  which  urban  criminal  groups 
takeover the control of some of the poorest neighborhoods in those violent cities, and get 
nurtured by recruiting adolescents of their own neighborhoods. Adolescents on their part are 
often bound to attend school and get locked in their houses while not at school, or rather 




This  paper is  organized as  follows. The next  section presents  a revision of the relevant 
literature.  Then  we  put  forward  some  hypotheses  consistent  with  a  causal  relation  from 
                                                           
1 See Krug et al. (2002). 
2 See Llorente and Rivas (2005). 
3 See Flórez and Soto (2007). 
4 The Colombian case is described by Gaitán (1995) and Rubio (2007) among others, while for the international 
one we provide various references in the next section. 
5 Documentaries like ―The City of God‖ for the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, and ―La Sierra‖, ―Rodrigo D: No 
Future‖, and ―The Rose Seller‖ for poor neighborhoods of Medellín respectively, illustrate the reality of lives 
by youths in violent neighborhoods of those cities. See also Salazar (1993, 2002), and Vallejo (1998). 2 
 
adolescent fertility and homicides, to proceed to describe the patterns of crime in Colombia 
and Bogotá, before we present our identification strategy, empirical results, and conclusions. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
 
Research on economic theory of crime and its  empirical validity, has risen substantially 
since Becker‘s  (1968) seminal  paper.  The traditional approach has  focused in  the crime 
reducing effect of deterrence variables, by measuring the impact of different policies that 
attempt to raise the expected cost of crime and disabling the power of action of criminal, on 
crime. Usually this  studies  use the arrest  per  capita and incarceration  rate as  deterrence 
variables. 
 
The empirical validity of this hypothesis has become the focus of attention of many research 
agendas, due to the variety of results that the literature has found
6. On the one hand there is 
large literature that found that  a higher probability of arrest, measured by arrest per-capita, 
should  trigger decreases of  crime
7. Another  typical variable that is use d  in deterrence 
models, as quoted by Dills et al. (2008), is the size of the police force. In this case the main 
hypothesis is that an increase of police enforcement should increase the probability of arrest, 
and in consequence reduce crime, although, this implication is not immediate.  Dills et al 
(2008) argue that the standard crime model identifies as deterrence variables, the probability 
of arrest and conviction, along with the expected punishment and ―if these are held constant, 
police per se should have no additional impact‖. In fact, a long literature has found that this 
is not a straightforward relationship, and it is not always possible to conclude that more 
police means less crime.
89   
 
However there are two novel papers that provide a new evidence of the effect of police on 
crime, using the fact that terrorist attacks can induce exogenous variation in the allocation of 
police resources that can be used to estimate the causal impact of police on crime. The first 
one is the work by Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) who use as ―quasi experiment‖ the 
terrorist attack to some religious buildings in July 1994, and the subsequent intensified on 
police presence around Muslim and Jewish buildings.   They show that motor vehicle thefts 
fell significantly near to the place where terrorist attack occurred compared to the areas 
several blocks away where no extra police were deployed. The Second one is the paper of 
Draca et al. (2008) who look at the increased of security presence following the terrorist 
bombs  that  hit  London  in  July  2005.  Access  to  police  deployment  data  allows  them  to 
                                                           
6 For literature related on deterrence  models and empirical approaches, see Cameron (1988), Erlich(1973)  
Erlich (1996), Nagin (1997a), Levitt (2004), Lee and McCrary (2005). 
7  For papers that found a negative relation between crime and arrest per capita se e Grogger (1991), Layson 
(1985), Johnson and Raphael (2006), among others. 
8 See for example Cover and Th istle (1988), Cameron (1988), C ornwell and Trumbell (1994) an d Spelman 
(2000). On the basis of a series of criminological studies, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) state: ―no matter how 
it is deployed, police presence does not deter‖. Eck and Maguire (2000) has similar conclusion based on 
empirical research on police and crime in economics.  
9 Levitt (1997) pins out the endogeneity and in consequence causality problem of the majority of the empirical 
research that have attempted to find a relationship between crime and police enforcement. He resolves this, 
using  election  years  as  an  instrument  for  police  in  crime  equation.  Nonetheless,  this  work  has  been 
controversial for different reasons; McCrary‘s (2002). 3 
 
identify the magnitude of the causal impact of police on crime, who is negative and highly 
significant.
10 Circumstances under which these events took place were very atypical though, 
and thus, a relevant question is whether they resemble what actually happens under standard 
conditions. 
 
Additional research focuses  in alternative determinants of crime like the role play ed  by 
young teen mothers and  the abortion legalization, drug-taking prohibitions, guns laws and 
education in teen agers, have received significant attention in recent years. This new wave 
has been driven by the fact that United States and other countries, has experience d deeply 
and pronounces fluctuations on its crime rate, that can‘t be explained by the traditional facts. 
Specifically, since 1991 the United States has experience a widespread and persistent drop in 
crime, that have produce a explosion of new empirical hypothesis of this phenomenon.   
 
One of the most revolutionary ideas was propose by Donohue and Levitt (2001), who argued 
that legalization of abortion in US in 1970 (in five states) and 1973 (nationwide), has an 
abrupt influence in the cohorts born in the wake of liberalized abortion, that might influence 
crime rates 15-20 years later. Donohue and Levitt (2001) argued that legalized abortion may 
lead to reduced crime in different ways: first, abortion legalization generate smaller cohorts 
after  come  into  force,  and  this  means  that  when  that  cohort  reaches  most  prone  age  to 
commit crime, 18-24, there will be fewer young males in their highest-crime years, and thus 
less crime.  Second, and more interesting, is that access to legal abortion allows women to 
optimize the timing of childbearing and in consequence to bring up children in environments 
less likely to produce future criminals. In other words, legalized abortion reduces the number 
of children born under adverse circumstances, which strongly signals their potential future 
criminality.     
 
Donohue and Levitt (2001) presented empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
legalized abortion reduced crime fifteen to twenty years later. Moreover, their results suggest 
that an increase of 100 abortions per 1000 live births reduces cohorts‘ crimes by roughly ten 
percent. They also show that crime was almost 15-25% lower in 1997 than it would have 
been absent legalized abortion. 
 
Several authors have disputed Donohue and Levitt (2001) conclusion. Joyce (2003) conclude 
that the relation between crime and abortion is not causal (more abortion less crime), and is 
product of the result of confounding changes in crack cocaine and handgun use and the 
growth in abortion. After having estimated different model specifications using teen fertility 
and abortion rates, controlling for state and year fixed effects, Joyce (2003) conclude that 
association between abortion and teen fertility rates is inconsistent with the story that states 
with higher abortion rates have lower rates of unintended childbearing. Joyce‘s analysis of 
homicide rates and arrest year by year of age, indicates that teens born between 1968-1973 
                                                           
10 As Draca et al (2008) say, ― a crucial part of identifying a causal impact in this type of setting is establishing 
the exclusion restriction which shows that terrorist attacks affect crime through the post-attack increase in 
police deployment, rather than via other observable and unobservable factors correlated with the attack or 
shock‖. Moreover, they found a crime-police elasticity of (-0.32) approximately. 4 
 
in ―repeal‖ states and who come of age between 1986 and 1991 experience similar or greater 
increases in crime that teens in non-repeal states.
11 
 
In line with the previous discussion, using individual -level victimization, socio-economic 
and demographic information from the four years of the International Crime Victims Survey, 
Hunt (2003) found that an increase in the share of young pe ople born to a teen mother 
increases the assault rate. The relationship between crime and  that share goes in the same 
fashion as Donohue and Levitt (2001) arguments ; that is,  a higher share of children born 
from teen mothers is linked to a higher crime rat e. If children born from teen mothers are 
more likely to be unwanted than those born to older mothers,  that would affect parenting 
quality and potentially crime. Another interesting argument stressed by Hunt (2003) is that 
children of poor teenage mothers are less likely to have been able to invest in education and 
that would trigger low probabilities of obtaining well paid jobs
12. 
 
Krug et al. (2002) mention similar arguments and add two factors associated with violence in 
youths and teenage mothers, those are, poor attachment between parents and children and 
parental conflict in early childhood, since, teenage mothers are likely to be characterized by 
a family environment that includes these  factors. Another important fact is the role played 
by social interactions developed in the neighborhood where teenage mothers lived, since 
they are more likely to live in neighborhood with high levels of crime. 
 
Following the growing empirical evidence that higher wages reduce crime, Lochner (2004) 
developed a human cap ital framework to study crime.  He  studies  the different possible 
relations between crime and human capital, defining the last as individual endowments 
(learning ability) and education. The main two channels through which human capital affects 
crime  are:  (i)  the  opportunity  cost  generated  by  engag ing  in  crime  is  increased  for 
individuals with high human capital levels due to the higher wage they would receive in the 
legal market, and (ii) more investment in skills and training increases the cost associated to 
incarceration, since they increase the  cost of  time  spent in prison.  This framework also 
suggest that the relationship between white collar crime and both age and education should 
                                                           
11 ―Repeal‖ states, are the 5 states where the legalized abortion was implemented first: New York, Washington, 
Alaska, California and Hawaii. See also Joyce (2007), Foote and Goetz (2008) and Dillls and Miron (2006) for 
other critiques to Donohue and Levitt (2001, 2004), and Donohue and Levitt (2008) for a response to Foote and 
Goetz (2008).   
12 Other studies supporting the relationship between teenage motherhood and their children‘s likelihood to 
commit crime in the future are Farrington (1998), Nagin et al (1997) and Sen (2002). This last one paper 
founds that lagged teen births rates affect sexual and physical assault rates, for Canada. On the other hand, 
there are other papers that have studied the effect of economic variables on crime using data from a single 
country. Broadly speaking what literature had found is that the relationship between wages and crime, and 
unemployment and crime is weak and in some cases insignificant (See Zeelenberg, Beki and Montfort [1999], 
Gould, Weinberg and Mustard [2002], and Raphael and Winter [2001]). Ayres (1998) argue that the fact that 
there is no direct causality does not mean that the two issues are unrelated; instead that data shows that violence 
is countercyclical (Homicide rates rise in periods of low economic activity), suggesting that unemployment has 
some effect in crime (quoted in Heinemann and Verner [2006]). On the other hand, Fajnzylber, Lederman and 
Loayza  (1998,  2002a  and  2002b)  found  that  inequality  increases  crime.  However,  for  Latin  America, 
Heinemann and Verner (2006)  stress that this relationship between inequality and crime is not straightforward; 
―Some countries have seen  decreasing income inequality accompanied by an increase in violence such as 
Brazil  and Venezuela, or a decrease in homicide rates accompanied by an increase in income inequality (Costa 
Rica and Mexico)‖ (Morrison, Buvinic and Shifter [2003])   5 
 
differ from those for lesser-skilled crimes. All of this claims has as consequence that ―violent 
and property crimes are mostly a problem among young uneducated men‖ (Lochner [2004]). 
Using  data  from  the  National  Longitudinal  Survey  of  Youth,  and  arrest  data  from  the 
Uniform Crime Reports, Lochner (2004) found empirical support for this framework
13. 
 
Lochner and Moretti (2004) also find that education reduces crime, and the probabilities of 
incarceration and arrests, due to a causal relation between education and criminal behavior. 
They highlight the fact that private returns to schooling could be increased between 14 to 16 
percent due to its external effect on criminal activity, a very important result, mainly in 
developing  economies  in  which  private  returns  to  secondary  education  are  becoming 
negligible, making adolescents more l ikely to drop out of school.  Education would make 
efforts to reduce crime much more cost effective than increasing the number of police 
officers, as pointed at by Heckman and Masterov (2007). 
 
Heckman (2008) gives us additional elements to consider when an alyzing the relationship 
between people‘s socioeconomic background, and their likelihood of engaging in crime later 
in life. First, he stressed that recent literature suggests ―that a major determinant of child 
disadvantage is the quality of the nurturing environment rather than just financial resources 
available or presence or absence of parents‖, and we know that a less educated mother, and 
especially,  teenage  mothers,  are  determinants  of  a  low  quality  of  early  environment. 
Moreover, he recalled that ―those in less advantaged circumstances are much less likely to 
receive cognitive and socio-emotional stimulation and other family resources‖. 
 
For  Latin  America,  among  others,  De  Mello  and  Schneider  (2008)  found  that  the  age 
structure explain a significant part of the variation in homicides at the states of Sao Paulo 
during  the  period  of  1990-2005.  They  also  found  that  more  high-school  drop-out  rates 
increase homicides. Although international evidence does not support this result
14, De Mello 
and Schneider (2008) argued that the relationship between crime and age structure would 
depend  on  the  efficacy  of  the  judicial  system,  law  enforcement,  and  institutional  
development, among others. So, perhaps these kinds of  differences between development 
cities and underdevelopment cities like Sao Paulo State, make that ―the environment was 
ripe for demography to flourish as a cause of homicides‖ (De Mello and Schneider, 2008)
15. 
 
Cohen and Rubio (2007) present some of the principal problems of ―crime and violence‖ for 
a number of Latin-American countries, based on a survey that was conducted by the IDB for 
that project. They identified the following facts on ―crime and violence‖ for Latin America: 
first,  high incidence of crime;
16  second, high variance of homicide and  violence rates
17; 
                                                           
13 Specifically, he found a strong negative correlation between unskilled crime and cognitive ability and a 
negative effect of education on property and violent crime.   
14 De Mello and Schneider (2008) stress Levitt (1999) as an example against their arguments. 
15 Poner esta nota de pie de página el trabajo de Bonilla(2009b) 
16 Cohen and Rubio (2007) quote an estimate of the World Health Organization (WHO) who points out that the 
number of homicides committed with firearms in Latin America has reached three times the world average. 
Moreover, violence is the leading cause of death among Latin Americans between the ages of 15 and 44. 
17  There great different in the homicide rate in time and space across Latin America countries. Even in small 
geographical areas, like municipalities, ―difference in the level of violence can be staggering‖ (Cohen and 
Rubio, 2007). This point is also stress out in Krug et al. (2002) 6 
 
third, the problem of youth gangs and violence; fourth, is that most crime and violence in 
Latin America are committed by young men. They also found that youth gangs work with 
organized crime and that among young people, the most serious violence is perpetuated by 
gang members
18; finally, they mentioned other risk factors for juvenile delinquency and gang 
membership. An important conclusion is that poverty is not the most significant factor  to 
determine crime neither it is a necessary condition for  gang membership. Dropping out of 
school seems to be a stronger risk factor.  
 
Buvinic,  Morrison  and  Orlando  (2005)   set  out  five  reasons  that  explain  high  youth 
criminality in Latin America;  drop out of high school or low school performance, high 
unemployment rates among formative years, weak law enforcement and poor efficacy of the 
judicial system on adolescent and early middle -age criminals, access to alcohol and drugs 
taking and the availability to a fire gun
19.      
 
After a complete review of the recent literature and account for the main ideas and empirical 
findings on crime and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean, Heinemann and Verner 
(2006) stressed some risk factor for violent and criminal behavior, such as, inequality rather 
than the overall levels of development, lack of education, low social capital, unemployment 
and lack of opportunities, unruly urbanization and inoperative and inefficient criminal justice 
system (Heinemann and Verner, 2006).  
 
Given the circumstances of violence in Colombi a since late 60‘s, literature of definitions, 
determinants and cost of violence, among others, have been profuse
20. Although, literature 
on the economics of crime for Colombia was scant until the late nineties. Gaitán (1995) was 
one of the first papers that  tried to explain causes of violence under a different approach 
from  the traditional focus, named by   Sanchez et al. (2003)   and  Bonilla  (2009)  as  ―the 
objectives causes of violence‖. Bonilla (2009) mention the main findings of Gaitán (1995) 
which can be summarized as follows: first, Colombia has not always been a violent country; 
there  have  been  different  long  periods  of  calm  where  the  violence  was  in  normal 
international standards. Second, the boom of violence in the late sixties and in the early 
eighties  was  promoted  principally  by  the  broken  of  the  judicial  system.  Third,  policies 
implemented  by  different  governments  have  been  poor,  in  reference  with  international 
patterns.  Fourth,  the  excessive  level  of  violence  is  not  explained  by  the  high  rates  of 
inequality and poverty, among others.  
 
In recent years, research on economic of crime has been in agendas of many researches and 
academic institutions. Literature on crime in Colombia has found that weak law enforcement 
                                                           
18 Another interesting issue sketched out by Rubio (2007), based on a self-report survey, and is that gang 
membership  increase  the  probability  to  commit  an  offence.  Moreover,  gangs  almost  monopolize  extreme 
violence among young people. 
19 For a complete description of crime stylized facts and policy implications for Latin America see Buvinic, 
Morrison and Orlando (2005) 
20 Referring Gaitán (1995), Bonilla (2009) stress out that there are many works previous to the former.  See for 
example the report from de Commission of Violence Studies, who point out the main ―objective causes‖ of 
violence.(Bonilla, 2009) 7 
 
and poor efficacy of the judicial system are among the most important causes of crime
21. It 
has also found that poverty and inequality have the same effects on violence  than in other 
countries, in consequence, they are not the driving forces of violence. This argument is also 
supported by the fact that several of the richest municipalities have high homicide rates.
22 
 
The study most closely  related to ours is the one by Gaviria et al. (2010), who assess the 
capitalization in house prices of  their neighborhoods‘ violence. To do it, they used cross 
section data of households for Bogotá to estimate a hedonic regression that explained house 
prices as a function of control variables at the household and census sectors levels, including 
among the later the homicide rate. To correct the endogeneity of the homicide rate of the 
census  sector,  they  separately  consider  two  instrumental  variables  related  to  adolescent 
fertility: the age difference between the mother and her oldest co-resident child, as a proxy 
for defining a household as having had at least one child born from an adolescent mother, 
and the rate of adolescent mothers in the census sector. 
 
Notice first, that while the age difference instrument is a proxy for the lagged effective 
adolescent fertility rate, it is not actually telling us the average adolescent fertility rate of any 
specific age cohort currently inhabiting the census sector, since the child that was born from 
an adolescent mother in a specific household might be currently someone of any age, and 
does not necessary belong to the peak ages for violent crime, estimated by Donohue and 
Levitt (2001) around 18-24 for the US, and by Giraldo et al. (2010) between 18 and 30 for 
the case of Medellín. Although it is still true that all children born in a household, in which 
there was at least one child born when his mother was adolescent, share some common 
characteristics, and that according to a wide literature some of those characteristics are likely 
to make them more likely to become criminals, in this study we additionally attempt to link 




In addition, we use information at two points in time separated by 12 years, which allows us 
to control for unobservable variables invariant in time, w hile their results rely on cross 
sectional evidence. We also have 20 years lags of the adolescent fertility rate, and 10 and 20 
years lags of the homicide rate, which allow us to assess the causal relation  that goes from 
adolescent fertility to crime, and as we will explain it later, to instrument for measurement 
error problems. Our Population Census data allow us to include the share of migrants by 
census sector in Bogotá, which had not been accounted for previously.  Not only with better 
information does this paper advances with respect to   Gaviria  et  al.‘s  work,  but  also  in 
accounting for the spatial autocorrelation of crime, a regularity widely robust within cities. 
 
We  now  proceed  to  describe  some  mechanisms  we  consider  that  are  behind  the  causal 
relation that goes from adolescent fertility to the homicide rate of the census sector. 
 
                                                           
21 See Rubio (1999) and Montenegro, Posada and Piraquive (2000), Sanchez et al. (2003) and Echeverry and 
Partrow (1998).  
22 Bonilla (2009) stress that four previous papers, Echandía (1997), Cubides, Sarmiento y Becerra and Sánchez 
(2007) support this argument. 
23 For evidence showing that children born from an adolescent mother are more likely to become criminals see 
Farrington (1998), Hunt (2003), Krug et al. (2002), Morash (1989), and Nagin (1997). 8 
 
III.  Adolescent Fertility and Crime Within Cities 
 
We do not know of any reason why a child born of a teen mother is more likely to become 
criminal per se. There are socioeconomic reasons why that might end up happening though. 
 
We know that the opportunity cost of studying for a teen mother is higher, and so, it is more 
costly for them to become well educated. Teen mothers might not yet be mature enough to 
raise their child; they might not be married at the time of pregnancy, and might not have 
planned yet to have their child. 
 
Donohue and Levitt (2001) report that abortion has a large effect on the fertility  rate of 
teenagers, and on that of teenagers out of wedlock. If that is the case, it should be more 
likely that under abortion prohibition, as it is the case in Colombia, children born of teenage 
mothers were unwanted, which according to the literature previously mentioned, makes them 
more likely to be involved in crime. In particular, Donohue and Levitt (2001) report that 
teenage motherhood and single parenthood might have increased the homicide rate in the US 
from  8.9  percent  to  12.5  percent;  that  unwantedness  might  have  increased  it  from  12.5 
percent to 18.5 percent; and point to the studies by Dagg (1991), David et al. (1998), and 
Posner (1992), according to which women who sought abortion and were denied that right, 
were less likely to nurture, hold, and breastfeed their children, and their children were more 
likely to be involved in crime and have poor life prospects 
 
These results become particularly relevant in the case of Colombia, where Flórez and Soto 
(2007) show that out of the wedlock adolescent mothers have increased from 18.0 percent in 
1990, to 22.4 percent in 2000, and 29.6 percent in 2005, for women never united.
24 Here 
again we also recall the negative consequences on labor force participation and poverty of 
unplanned unwed motherhood reported by Bronars and Grogger (1994). 
 
In addition, teen mothers are not a random sample of the population, but rather, more likely 
to be among the worse off. Flórez et al. (2004) present evidence using data of women from 
Bogotá and Cali, according to which adolescent women from low socioeconomic strata have 
sexual relations and become mothers much earlier than  those in the highest socioeconomic 
strata. 
 
Not only teenage motherhood, single parent family, and unwantedness , has been found to 
increase the risk of violent crime for males, but  Räsänen  et al. (1999) also found that 
mother‘s low education was another key determinant. 
 
Finally,  we  will  show  that  precarious  living  standards  often  lead  to  adolescent  fertility 
among the worse off in environments in which most of the previously mentioned elements 
coincide, but still they might happen in the absence of violence, as it is the case in several 
places within Colombia. Thus, we consider that at least for the case of Colombia, where 
there has been a history of organized crime, it is the presence of gangs and any sort of 
organized  crime,  what  becomes  key  to  promote  crime  by  exploiting  the  precarious 
                                                           
24 Beck et al. (1993) report that in 1991, 43 percent of prisoners reported having only one parent, 39 percent 
grew up with their mother and 4 percent with their father. 9 
 
conditions  existent in  several  neighborhoods  of its  cities, making it much easier  for the 
increasing returns of crime, pointed at by Gaviria (2000), to prevail. 
 
IV.  Patterns of Crime in Colombia and Bogotá 
 
In this section we describe the evolution of crime in Colombia and Bogotá, and present main 
statistics  of  the  variables  employed  in  this  study,  which  are  those  associated  with  the 
hypotheses  set  out  by  the  economic  literature  on  crime.  Our  sources  for  the  empirical 
exercises  are  the  1973,  1985,  1993  and  2005  Population  Census,  provided  by  the 
Administrative Department of National Statistics (DANE, by its acronym in Spanish), and 
Police statistics for Bogotá. We use data at the census sector level for all variables. 
 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the homicide rate in Colombia and Bogotá, over the period 
1980-2008.  At  the  national  level,  homicide  rates  began  to  rise  in  the  early-1980s  and 
continued increasing until early-1990s, when it began a temporal decline until late 1990s, 
when homicides rates begin to climb again at levels of late 1980s. After the peaking in the 
late 1990s and early 2000, homicides rates presented a persistent decline reaching levels not 
seeing since late seventies.  For Bogota the behavior is similar to national rates, except that 




Figure 1. Homicide Rate in Colombia and Bogotá, 1980-2007
26 
   
Source: (*) Took from Melo (2008) who used data from National Police Department, (Dirección Central 
Policía Judicial) (**) Took from Sánchez et al. (2007) who used data from National Police Department
27. 
 
                                                           
25 The increase in homicide rate, experienced in late nineties in Bogota is associated with the increase in the use 
of guns as method of attack, see Figure A1. Krug et al. (2002) stress similar arguments at national level. In fact 
Krug et al. (2002) stress that for the period 1985-1994, ―youth homicides increased by 159%, from 36.7 per 
100.000 to 95 per 100.000, with 80% of cases at the end of this period involving guns‖.   
26  For the purpose of this study, we understand homicide as the activity by which one person kills another (Art 
323 Penal Code). We define the homicide rate as number of homicide for every 100.000 habitants. 
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Figure 1 shows two interesting episodes of crime in Colombia; the first one is a period of 
very  high  homicide  rates,  and  it  goes  from  the  late  eighties  to  early  2000s.  This  high 
homicide rates are attributed to the boom of Medellin drug cartel, and it‘s declaration of war 
to the government and other illegal groups.
28 The second one, and the most interesting, is the 
persistent  decline  in  the  homicide  rate  observe  since  early  2000‘s,  attributed  to  the 
strengthening of law enforcement since President‘s Uribe came into power.
29  
 
Let us now analyze the evolution of the adolescent fertility rate in Colombia. Figure 2 shows 
its evolution at the national and urban  levels, and for Bogotá. The curves illustrating the 
national and urban trends were estimated from the Demographic Health Survey, DHS, by 
Flórez and Soto (2007). Those curves show a similar U sh ape pattern for the national and 
urban levels, with a peak in the late 1960s, lowest levels from mid 1970s to mid 1980s, and a 
subsequent increase until mid 1990s, where it remains stable until 2005. Notice that the 
increase of adolescent fertility rates from mid 1980s until mid 1990s follows the pattern of 
the homicide rate in Bogota shown in Figure 1. This fact might be picking other relationship 
that goes from crime to adolescent fertility: as violence increases in city‘s neighborhoods, 
more males involved in gangs are sought by their female partners to have a child of them. 
These women, afraid of losing their partners in the city‘s war, become eager to have a child 
of them, no matter their circumstances.
30 Thus, we expect the relationship from crime to 
adolescent fertility to operate contemporary, while that from adolescent fertility to crime 
with a lag of as many years as it might take males of the specific place to reach the peak ages 
for violent crime. 
 
There are two curves that illustrate the adolescen t fertility rate in Bogotá: one of them 
presents the estimates obtained from the 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Colombia Population 
Census, and the other estimated by Flórez (2009), who uses the 2005 DHS and Population 
Census, to present a corrected figure for that year. As it is argued by Flórez (2009), there are 
biases in the figure gotten from the 2005 census, which highly underestimates its actual 
magnitude. Once the figure is corrected the result shows that adolescent fertility in Bogotá 
would have remained stable between 1993 and 2005.
31 
 
We now proceed to study the variation in homicide rates within Bogotá. We have fertility 
and homicide rates at the census sector level from the population  census and police records 
                                                           
28 In 1993, the year in which Pablo Escobar, the leader of the Medellín Cartel, was murderer, the homicide rate 
in Medellín was around 310 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. In 1991, the year in which the indicator peaked 
in Medellín, it reached 360 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. 
29 Although national homicide rate present a persistent decline in recent years,  Sanchez and Nuñez (2007) 
recall that the evolution of homicides rates has been heterogeneous across states, since they respond to different 
factors like drug trafficking routes, guerilla and paramilitary interventions, etc. 
30  The  famous  documentary  ―La  Sierra‖,  shows  how  members  of  gangs  use  to  date  several  women 
simultaneously, each of them wanting to have a child of him as a mean to keep him for them, and to assure 
having his heir before he gets murdered. 
31  Flórez (2009) highlights different problems presented in the 2005 Population Census, specifically, arguing 
that  ―the  quality  of  data  on  children  ever  born  in  the  2005  Population  Census  presents  deficiencies  that 
underestimates the levels of teenage fertility indicators‖. Fl￳rez (2009) estimated in nearly 7.5 percent the 
adolescent fertility rate in Bogota for women between twelve and nineteen years, versus a figure of less than 5 
percent according to the 2005 Population Census. This controversy is not relevant for the purposes of our 
empirical work below because we use the 20 years lagged adolescent fertility rate. 11 
 
respectively.  The  city  has  nearly  600  census  sectors  with  an  average  of  around  10,000 
inhabitants  per  sector.  Census  sectors  register  a  wide  range  of  variation  of  both 
socioeconomic characteristics and homicide rates. 
 
We  seek  to  relate  lagged  adolescent  fertility  to  current  crime.  Since  we  need  both 
information on crime and socioeconomic data at the census sector level, we use for the 
former the census of homicides of Bogotá, and for the later, the 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 
Colombian Population Census. To have a reasonable lag period between both figures, we 
study  crime  in  1993  and  2005  as  a  function  of  adolescent  fertility  in  1973  and  1985 
respectively, that is, with a 20 year lag between them. 
 
Figure 3 has two graphs that illustrate the relationship between the change in homicide rate 
between 1993 and 2005, and the change in the adolescent fertility rate with a 20 year lag on 
the left, and in the same period on the right. In both cases, graphs show that there is a 
positive relation between crime and adolescent fertility rate. As we argued above, the figure 
on  the  left,  the  one  of  interest  for  this  study  would  represent  a  relation  that  goes  from 
adolescent fertility to crime, while that on the right a relation on the opposite direction. 
 
Figure 4 presents the relation across census sectors between homicide rates in 1985 and 2005 
for the left panel, and in 1993 and 2005 for the right panel. The figure illustrates the large 
persistency of crime at the census sector level along time. This regularity is in line with 
previous findings by Llorente and Rivas (2005), and by Sánchez et al. (2003). In particular, 
Llorente and Rivas (2005) conclude that violent crime in Bogotá is concentrated in certain 
places which proved to be roughly the same over time. Violence in those places  would 
expand or contract according to the wave of crime experienced by the city at the moment. 
 
Figure 5 shows that the levels of the homicide rate had increased substantially by 1993, and 
that  rather  than  increasing  in  just  a  few  census  sectors,  the  whole  distribution  shifted 
rightwards, consistent with the hypothesis of Llorente and Rivas according to which violent 
places are the same over time, their crimes just fluctuate with the conjuncture. It is also 
consistent  with  previous findings  presenting  evidence of spatial autocorrelation  in  crime 
rates,  under  which  it  is  unlikely  for  a  few  census  sectors  to  jump  rightwards  in  the 
distribution in an isolated fashion.












                                                           
32 For evidence of spatial autocorrelation see Núñez and Sánchez (2001), Sánchez and Núñez (2001), and 
Sánchez et al. (2003). 12 
 
Figure 2. Adolescent Fertility Rates in Bogotá 
 
Source: (
*) 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census, provide by DANE. (
**) Flórez (2009). 
(
***) Flórez and Soto (2007) based on DHS. 
 
Figure 3. Relation between Adolescent Fertility Rates and Crime  
 
      Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census, and National Police-Dijin. 
 
Figure 4. Persistency of the Homicide Rate across Census Sectors. Bogotá, 1985-2005. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of the Homicide Rate by Census Sector in Bogotá. 
 
      Source: National Police-Dijin 
 
 




    Source: National Police-Dijin 
 
In order to deeply explore the role of the adolescent fertility on crime, figure 6 shows the 
adolescent  fertility  rates  kernel  densities  by  census  sector  for  different  years.  It  can  be 
observed that although adolescent fertility rates increased substantially during 1980s and 
1990s, this phenomenon was intensified in almost the same census sectors, due to the fact 










                                                           
33  Quintiles are normalized with 1993 as the baseline year. 14 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of Adolescent Fertility Rates, by Census Sector in Bogotá. 
 
      Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
 
Map 2 shows the spatial distribution of adolescent fertility rates and it stands out the high 
spatial  correlation  with  homicides  rates  for  the  last  three  years  presented  in  both  maps, 
although  for 1973 this  contemporaneous  correlation  is  less  evident. As we mentioned it 
before,  the  work  by  Gaviria  et  al.  (2010)  had  previously  detected  this  relationship  for 
Bogotá, and used the adolescent fertility rate at the census sector level as an instrumental 
variable for crime in a hedonic prices regression, showing cross sectional evidence that they 
were significantly correlated.
34 Here again, the contemporaneous relation should go from 
crime to adolescent fertility, while we are interested on the causal relationship  going from 
lagged adolescent fertility to crime. 
 
Map 2. Quintiles of Adolescent Fertility Rates. 
 




                                                           
34 They also found a spatial autocorrelation between the homicide rate and the age difference between the 
youths in each census sector and their respective mothers (their proxy variable for youths born from a teenage 
mother, or lagged fertility rates), of 0.044, and statistically significant. 15 
 
Another  important  variable  that  is  associated  with  crime,  especially  for  Latin  American 
countries, is the school attendance in secondary and college. Figure 7 shows that school 
attendance  rates  in  secondary  have  improved  substantial  during  the  analyzed  period. 
Although there is a persistent increase in the college attendance rate from the 1970s to the 
late 1990s, the progress is modest if we compare it with secondary attending rates.  
 
This can be confirmed if we compare map 3 and map 4, which sows the spatial distribution 
of school attendance in secondary and college. Map 3 shows that the big jump of secondary 
attendance rates started by the mid 1980s, and during all decade of the nineties this tendency 
pronounced. An important issue that it is appreciated from Map 3 is that by the end 2005 
school attendance had increased in most areas of Bogotá, including the poorest zones located 




Figure 7. Distribution of School Attendance Rates in Secondary and College, by Census 
Sector in Bogotá 
 
  Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
Map 3. Quintiles of School Attendance Rates in Secondary 
 
    Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
Map 4 sets what we establish in the last paragraph. Although school attendance rates in 
college have improved during the last two decades, the progress has settled in the northeast 
zone of Bogota, while the marginalized sectors at the southwest still have low attendance 
                                                           
35 See Maps 3 and 5. 16 
 
rates. The two different zones distinguished in the map, the one at the northeast and the other 
at the southwest, represent the existence of two types of cities within Bogotá, that of the 
better off and the worse off respectively, as it is found by Medina et al. (2008). 
 
Map 4. Quintiles of School Attendance Rates in College 
 
 
    Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
One of the most controversial economic explanations trying to explain crime argues that it is 
more likely to emerge under high unemployment rates. As we reviewed above, the empirical 
literature testing that hypothesis has found that the relationship is weak, and in some cases 
insignificant. Figure 8 is in line with this result; while unemployment rate was at the lowest 
levels in the early 1990s, the homicide rate reached its highest level in 1993. The opposite 
situation took place in 2005, when the homicide rate was at 1980s level, but unemployment 
rate was at a significant superior level than 1993. 
 
Map 5 shows an interesting regularity, and it is that even though we saw that the homicide 
rate follows a different dynamic than the unemployment rate, the unemployment rate could 
have a similar spatial pattern to crime. A reason could be that young men respond to the 
economic returns of crime, and these returns will be perceived as relatively larger if legal 
employment and resources become scarce. However, international literature have found that 
unemployment is not related to extreme violent crime like homicides, rather unemployment 















Figure 8. Distribution of the Unemployment Rate by Census Sector in Bogotá 
 
    Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
Map 5. Quintiles of the Unemployment Rate 
 
 
    Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
On the other hand it is worth to note that several socioeconomic variables have reported a 
constant improvement in Bogotá, like those included in the so called index of Unsatisfied 
Basic Needs, (NBI for its acronym in Spanish), which accounts for changes in the access to 
housing, water and sanitation, education among others (See figure A1). Nonetheless, family 
structure has experienced important changes, as it can be observed in figure A2, where the 
increase in the share of female headed households becomes clear. 
 
A  topic  in  the  literature  of  economic  crime  that  has  not  been  studied  deeply  is  the 
relationship between crime and migration from other regions of the country to the different 
neighborhoods  of  a  specific  city.  There  are  some  studies  that  account  for  the  effect  of 
migration between countries or between states within a country though. Bianchi et al. (2008) 
set  out  some  endogeneity  problems  that  could  be  presented  in  the  estimations  that  link 
immigration and crime, as result of unobserved ―demand-pull‖ factors that are correlated 
with  the  location  choice  of  immigrants  within  the  destination  country  and  crime.  Once 
endogeneity is taken into account total criminal offenses as well as most types of crime are 
not related to the size of immigrant population. Butcher and Piehl (1998a) find that current 
U.S. immigrants have lower incarceration rates than natives. Moreover, when controls are 18 
 
included  for  characteristics  correlated  with  the  labor  market  opportunities  and  criminal 
justice enforcement, incarceration rates are much lower for immigrants that for natives. In 
addition, Butcher and Phiehl (2007) suggests that deportation and deterrence of immigrants‘ 
crime from the threat of deportation are not driving the result of lower incarceration rates for 
immigrants: ―Rather, immigrants appear to be self-selected to have low criminal propensities 
and this has increased over time‖ (Butcher and Phiehl, 2007). Butcher and Piehl (1998b) 
look  at  a  sample  of  U.S.  metropolitan  areas  over  the  1980s  and  conclude  that  new 
immigrants‘ inflows had no significant impact on crime rates. See also Hagan and Palloni 
(1999) for comparisons of border to non-border cities with larger immigrant populations, and 
Lee, Martinez and Rosenfeld (2001) for an analysis of the influence of immigrants (Latinos 
and African Americans) to crime. In both cases immigration is not associated with higher 
levels of homicide. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  Alonso  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  both  immigrants  and  natives  have 
contributed to the recently increase in the crime rate in Spain. ―This result is partly explained 
by the fact that immigration has contributed to the main increase of the collective of males 
aged 20 to 50, which are responsible for most offences and by differences in socioeconomic 
opportunities between migrants and natives (Alonso et al. 2008). Moehling and Piehl (2007) 
describe  similar  patterns  for  immigrants  in  the  early  1900s  in  U.S.  where  foreign  born 
between  18  and  19  years  old  were  disproportionately  represented  among  prison 
commitments for major offenses. This would be suggestive evidence that ―adjustment‖ and 
―culture conflict‖ issues were a factor in this period (Something interesting here is that, 
almost half of the foreign born between18 and 19 years old, were rent arrivals in the U.S. 
 
In the last twenty years Bogotá has received large flows of people proceeding from other 
zones of the country. This phenomenon was intensified in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Map 6 shows migration from other regions to Bogotá, by the same cohort. In particular, we 
follow individuals who were 20-30 years old in 1985, 28-38 in 1993 and 40-50 in 2005; dark 
sectors represent people born in Bogotá, while light sector are those who were born outside 
the capital. Notice that 20-30 years old migrants arriving in Bogotá in 1985 are relatively 
disperse, while by 1993 and 2005 they are much clustered towards the southwest, and the 
west of the city. People born in Bogotá on their part, cluster in the central-northeast zone. 
This  shows  a  similar  spatial  pattern  between  migrants  and  crime,  with  places  in  which 
migrants live being the most violent of the city. 
 
In Map 7 we can appreciate that the phenomenon of large flows of migrants from other 
regions started in the decade of eighties and continue during the nineties; by the early 2000s 











Map 6. Migration from Other Cities by Generation 
 
Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
 
Map 7. Migration from Other Cities to Bogota, by the Same Generation 
 
Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
Maps A1, A2, A3 and A4, show that migrants to Bogotá come from Antioquia, the Central 
Zone, the Pacific and Atlantic Zones, respectively. These are the zones with the larger shares 
of total migrants. 
 
V.  Identification Strategy and Results 
 
In  this  section  we  present  the  empirical  strategy  to  identify  the  causal  relation  between 
adolescent fertility and crime, and the results of different model specifications that include 
the control variables most related to crime according to the economic literature. We exploit 
the cross section and longitudinal variation at the census sector level,  of crime and key 
socioeconomic variables, for Bogotá. 
 
We present a baseline model from which we get cross section estimates for 1993 and 2005, 
estimates of the pooled sample, and difference-in-differences estimates. We first get these 
estimates  using  the  contemporaneous  relation  between a set  of socioeconomic variables, 
including  adolescent  fertility,  and  the  homicide  rate.  Although  we  are  aware  that  there 
should  not  be  any  causal  contemporaneous  relationship  from  adolescent  fertility  to 20 
 
homicides, but maybe the other way around, we present the results in order to compare them 
with previous work. 
 
Then we proceed to estimate the pooled and difference-in-differences baseline model using 
the lagged adolescent fertility rate of the census sector, which we construct as the effective 
adolescent fertility rate. We also introduce interactions of the effective adolescent fertility 
rate  to  explore  potential  mechanism  under  which  adolescent  fertility  ends  up  affecting 
homicide rates. First, we iterate it with an inverse measure of secondary enrollment of the 
census sector about ten years ago, that is, at the time individuals currently in their peak crime 
ages were about entering adolescence; secondly, we introduce a triple interaction with the 
same enrollment variable, and the homicide rate of the census sector about ten years ago. 
 
Finally, we estimate a model that accounts for spatial autocorrelation, and present several 
robustness checks. 
 
1.  Baseline Model 
 
We begin estimating cross section models for years 1993 and 2005 of the following form
36 
 
  it it it i it u SE AFR h           (1) 
 
Where hit is the homicide rate, AFRit is the adolescent fertility rate, and SEit is a vector of 
socioeconomic variables for census  sector  i like the  unemployment  rate of the sector,  a 
quality of life indicator denominated Unsatisfied Basic Needs, NBI, school attendance rates 
in  primary,  secondary  and  college,  SAR(Primary),  SAR(Secondary),  and  SAR(College) 
respectively, the share of ethnic minority, Minority ethnic rate, educational attainment of 
people 25 and older in the census sector, Education level 25; the share of residents between 
twenty and thirty years old who have lived for more than 5 years in that census sector and 
were born in one of eight different regions outside of Bogotá, Share Residents (Born in 
Atlántico), Share Residents (Born in East Zone), Share Residents (Born in Central Zone), 
Share  Residents  (Born  in  Pacific  Zone),  Share  Residents  (Born  in  Antioquia),  Share 
Residents (Born in Valle), Share Residents (Born in San Andres and Providence Islands), 




Our model has the implicit assumption that children born of an adolescent mother about 20 
years ago commit crime in the census sector they currently live. Giraldo et al. (2010) show 
that when we exclude the homicides committed in down town, 49% of the total homicides 
were committed 1.5 neighborhoods of distance to the centroid of the census sector where the 
criminal lived.
38 This fact gives support to our implicit assumption.  
 
                                                           
36 We use robust standard errors in all of the specifications. 
37 See Table A3 for details in the construction of variables. 
38 A neighborhood in this case, has a similar size to a census sector, that is, about 10,000 inhabitants in the case 
of Bogotá. 21 
 
The 2005 Population Census allows us to determine whether a household lived 5 years ago 
in the same place it currently lives, and the 1993 Population Census allows us to determine 
whether it lived 5 years ago in the municipality it currently lives. We use this information to 
restrict our 2005 (1993) sample to households who live today in the same census sector 
(municipality) they lived 5 years ago. We did this basically because we wanted to capture 
the structural relationship between adolescent fertility and crime. We are not focused on the 
type of criminal who moves from one place to the other, but on the one that grows up at least 
since his adolescence, in a place with key characteristics we can control for, that help to 
determine  and explain  his  current  decision  to  have  engaged into criminal  activities. We 
expect individuals who frequently move within the city to have grounds that lead them to 
commit crime, weakly linked at the most, to the socioeconomic conditions of the place in 
which they currently reside, thus, although they are as well important to account for the 
levels of crime in their neighborhoods, controlling for them might prevent us from, rather 
than help us to, identify the relationship between adolescent fertility and crime.  
 
Tables 1 and 2 present the results of estimating equation (1) using two specifications for the 
years 1993 and 2005. For 1993 we have 443 census sectors in our sample while for 2005 we 
have 451. Each set of results contains OLS estimates using robust standard errors. Table 3 
presents the results of estimating equation (1) using pooled data for both years. In this case 
we have 894 census sectors in our sample. 
 
The  estimation  for  1993  shows  that  there  is  no  significant  relation  between  adolescent 
fertility and homicides, although those for 2005 do at the 10 percent level, and the pooled 
estimates are again positive, and in that case, they are also statistically significant.  
 
Homicide  increases  with  the  share  of  female  headed  households  and  with  the  shares  of 
migrants, between twenty and thirty years old, from Antioquia and San Andrés for 1993, and 
the Central zone and Valle for 2005. The former result is not supported with the pooled data, 
as it is shown in table 3. Homicide rates increase with the share of migrants, between twenty 
and thirty years old, from Antioquia, Valle, San Andrés, the Central zone, and additionally, 
from the Atlantic zone. They also increase with adolescent fertility rates, and lastly, and 
surprisingly, with high school attendance rates in colleges. This surprising result disappears 
once  we  estimate  the  fixed  effects  model,  as  it  can  be  seen  in  Table  4.  In  that  table, 
adolescent fertility is again positively a significantly related to homicides, and so is the share 
of  female  headed  households.  In  this  estimation  we  control  for  the  age  structure  of  the 
population by census sector (Share pop. 0-10, Share pop. 11-20, Share pop. 21-30 and Share 
pop. 31-40).
39 On the other hand,  the homicide rate decreases in sectors with  the share of 





                                                           
39 Share pop. 0-10, Share pop. 11-20, Share pop. 21-30 and Share pop. 31-40 measure the share of the total 
population between 0-10 ten years, 11-20 years, 21-30 years and 31-40 years old, respectively. The intuition 
behind this variables is that census sector with a young structure population, specifically sectors with high 
shares of teen agers, are sector more prone to have higher homicide rates. 22 
 














coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR)  7.923 0.365 10.750 0.323 9.800 0.345
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -0.150 0.974 0.501 0.910 2.248 0.585
School Attendence Rate (Primary) -2.666 0.485 -1.617 0.691 3.232 0.530
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -0.217 0.931 0.078 0.976 -0.584 0.887
School Attendence Rate (College) 2.806 0.324 -0.378 0.861 5.042 0.206
Household Head Women (HH Women) 10.2*** 0.003 10.6*** 0.026 17.7*** 0.052
Illiteracy Rate 37.41 0.157 42.16* 0.125 38.23 0.233
Unemployment rate  -29.96* 0.133 -22.807 0.372 -22.621 0.330
Minority ethnic rate -0.848 0.654 -1.108 0.556 -2.009 0.312
Education level 25 26.421 0.452 119.6*** 0.084
Overall Schooling Rate 9.845 0.864 -248.2*** 0.088
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) -1.940 0.779
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -1.037 0.395
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 9.246 0.153
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) -3.195 0.801
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.9*** 0.047
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 8.249 0.520
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -167.0*** 0.047
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 2.240 0.904
Share pop. 0-10 -30.6*** 0.121
Share pop. 11-20 -17.760 0.278
Share pop. 21-30 -0.517 0.950
Share pop. 31-40 6.41 0.685
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 26.3 0.201
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 29.1*** 0.136
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 30.0*** 0.082
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 29.8*** 0.075









0.126 0.131 0.24223 
 
 
Table 2. OLS Estimates for Bogota, 2005. 
 
 
In short, we find similar results to those found by Gaviria et al.  (2010) when using the 
contemporaneous adolescent fertility rate, that is, a positive and significant relation between 
the contemporaneous adolescent fertility rate, and the homicide rate. In particular, although 
our cross section estimates do not provide a robust relationship between these variables, 
which might be due to the fact that we have less control variables than Gaviria et al. (2010), 





coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR)  4.925 0.388 8.394* 0.116 3.954 0.396
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.619 0.625 0.502 0.715 -0.878 0.543
School Attendence Rate (Primary) -8.003 0.167 -7.739 0.178 -6.948 0.188
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -0.247 0.847 0.004 0.997 -0.084 0.972
School Attendence Rate (College) 0.452 0.601 -0.915 0.535 1.269 0.207
Household Head Women (HH Women) -2.80** 0.065 -2.81** 0.028 -0.970 0.434
Illiteracy Rate -4.297 0.399 -3.974 0.428 -3.638 0.313
Unemployment rate  9.418 0.439 12.2 0.363 15.443 0.210
Minority ethnic rate -0.001** 0.060 -0.001** 0.074 -0.0** 0.074
Education level 25 38.3 0.407 36.8** 0.226
Overall Schooling Rate -27.9 0.560 -26.2 0.348
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.319 0.659
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -1.211 0.469
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 8.7** 0.001
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) -1.068 0.797
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) -2.077 0.273
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 8.8** 0.009
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -25.2 0.707
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) -10.1 0.346
Share pop. 0-10 0.221 0.977
Share pop. 11-20 10.1 0.213
Share pop. 21-30 -4.5** 0.087
Share pop. 31-40 7.9** 0.051
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 1,723** 0.103
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 1,851** 0.031
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 786.9 0.250
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 611.8 0.271









0.123 0.136 0.37124 
 
 













coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR)  14.2*** 0.015 15.1*** 0.031 16.3*** 0.020
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.319 0.866 0.290 0.876 0.416 0.811
School Attendence Rate (Primary) -2.830 0.362 -2.895 0.342 -2.047 0.544
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -1.574 0.237 -1.061 0.457 -1.174 0.576
School Attendence Rate (College) 1.724* 0.147 2.34** 0.032 3.6*** 0.007
Household Head Women (HH Women) 1.827 0.316 3.27** 0.076 3.798 0.157
Illiteracy Rate 0.069 0.983 1.009 0.740 -0.173 0.953
Unemployment rate  -6.167 0.460 -3.506 0.729 -5.367 0.588
Minority ethnic rate -0.001 0.208 -0.000 0.285 -0.001* 0.143
Education level 25 30.4 0.276 37.1 0.164
Overall Schooling Rate -39.1* 0.132 -61.9** 0.046
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 1.344 0.347
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -2.0** 0.041
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 8.7** 0.021
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) -0.450 0.895
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.7** 0.036
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 9.2** 0.034
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -88.5** 0.091
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) -0.689 0.954
Share pop. 0-10 -3.301 0.589
Share pop. 11-20 1.092 0.836
Share pop. 21-30 -0.941 0.758
Share pop. 31-40 7.5** 0.079
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 13.858 0.341
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 11.745 0.420
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 7.696 0.435
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 5.861 0.472









0.083 0.088 0.16725 
 
Table 4. Panel with FE for Bogotá 
 
 
2.  Identifying  the  Causal  Relation  Between  Adolescent  Fertility  and  the  Homicide 
Rate 
 
As we have argued so far, the contemporaneous relation between adolescent fertility and the 
homicide rate would work from homicides to adolescent fertility rather than the other way 
around.  
 
To identify the causal relationship we are interested in, we define the effective adolescent 
fertility rate, as the twenty years lag of the adolescent fertility rate of each census sector 
coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Adolescent Fertility Rate (AFR)  12.0** 0.071 11.5** 0.072 14.6*** 0.031
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -0.020 0.992 0.270 0.883 -1.805 0.405
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 1.476 0.574 1.183 0.650 1.711 0.478
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -0.662 0.689 0.281 0.865 -0.736 0.690
School Attendence Rate (College) -5.91*** 0.003 -2.87 0.189 -3.50* 0.124
Household Head Women (HH Women) 6.32*** 0.001 9.2*** 0.000 8.46*** 0.000
Illiteracy Rate -6.96*** 0.036 -5.172 0.167 -5.35* 0.143
Unemployment rate  2.848 0.606 5.505 0.296 5.413 0.354
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.793 0.000 0.579 0.000 0.587
Education level 25 18.139 0.461 14.9 0.574
Overall Schooling Rate -43.3** 0.052 -40.0 0.162
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) -0.351 0.775
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -1.155 0.311
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 5.261 0.161
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 3.644* 0.139
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.074 0.237
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -4.476 0.347
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -7.005 0.899
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) -5.302 0.649
Share pop. 0-10 2.248 0.692
Share pop. 11-20 1.854 0.712
Share pop. 21-30 -9.21*** 0.030
Share pop. 31-40 -6.74** 0.099
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 5.579 0.553
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 12.3 0.183
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years -2.936 0.646
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -2.889 0.632






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.223 0.244 0.307
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adjusted  for  migration,  closely  similar  to  what  Donohue  and  Levitt  (2001)  do.  So,  we 
determine the municipality of birth for all individuals in crime peak ages living in Bogotá at 
the moment the population census was collected, and we use the adolescent fertility rate of 
those municipalities, to calculated the effective adolescent fertility rate of each census sector 
as the average of those fertility rates, weighted by the number of individuals of that specific 
census sector that were born in each municipality.
40 
 
Table 5 and 6 presents pooled OLS and difference -in-differences estimates of equation (1) 
respectively, using the effective adolescent fertility rate. Aside the no n significance of the 
effective adolescent fertility rate, in both cases we obtain similar results from what we found 
in the previous estimations. At this point, we also perform some sensitive analysis excluding 
some census sectors, and what we find is that these results are not robust and the significance 
of parameters varies substantially. 
 
Although the lack of significance of our EAFR variable seems surprising, let us remember 
that it should not, per se, be linked to crime, but only as some specific conditions hold. 
 
Map 8 presents homicide rates and adolescent fertility rates for all of the 1104 municipalities 
of Colombia. The map  shows that there are municipalities with high adolescent fertility 
rates, and still, low homicide rates. This can be mainly appreciated in the Caribbean and 
Pacific zones. Notice that both variables are contemporaneously measured, but in this case it 
is important to bear in mind that they present a high persistency in long periods of time, 
which is not consistent with a positive causal effect from adolescent fertility to crime. That 
is, if adolescent fertility under the conditions existent in those regions, were to increase 
crime, crime should have picked up at some point, which never happened. Thus, there must 
other elements that are required to, coupled with adolescent fertility, propel crime among 
children of teen mothers, and increase crime in the future. 
 
There is previous work that sought to identify the causal relation between adolescent fertility 
per se, and some outcomes of interest, but could not do so. Geronimus and Korenman (1992) 
estimated the effects of teen young mother on long term socioeconomic status, controlling 
for race, age, urban/rural status, and the most important, family background characteristics.
41 
They find that adding the last controls, the observable family background characteristics, the 
socioeconomic differences associated with a teen birth are much smaller when compared 
with what traditionally the literature has found.
42 Using the ―twins-first‖ approach proposed 
by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980), Bronars and Grogger (1994) estimated that for black 
unwed women the effects of unplanned births had large and persistent negative effect, while 
for whites there is only a negative effect in the short run of unplanned births reflected on 
labor force participation and poverty.  
 
                                                           
40 In the case when the young teen mother born in Bogota we use the adolescent fertility rate of the census 
sector in which she reside.  
41  Large  Decreases  in  the  socioeconomic  differences  associated  with  a  teen  birth  appear,  specially,  when 
Geronimus and Korenman (1992) compared sisters who time their births at different ages, in this case is when 
―the estimated effects of a teen birth on most indicators of socioeconomic status narrow further‖ 
42 Some of the works that have found la rge negative effects of teenage childbearing are Trussell (1988) and 
Jencks (1989). Hoffman, Foster and Furstenberg (1993) found also similar results. 27 
 
Now  we  proceed  to  explore  potential  channels  through  which  the  EAFR  might  become 
linked to the homicide rate. 
 











coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  5.601* 0.119 5.601* 0.121 3.065 0.393
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.398 0.931 0.822 0.857 2.806 0.488
School Attendence Rate (Primary) -2.165 0.548 -1.426 0.715 3.783 0.455
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -0.874 0.717 -0.828 0.732 -1.338 0.733
School Attendence Rate (College) 1.739 0.342 -0.520 0.808 4.759 0.228
Household Head Women (HH Women) 11.3*** 0.001 11.6*** 0.011 17.7*** 0.047
Illiteracy Rate 38.875 0.168 42.6* 0.142 40.1 0.231
Unemployment rate  -33.7** 0.061 -29.9 0.161 -28.1 0.162
Minority ethnic rate -0.894 0.634 -1.034 0.580 -1.927 0.325
Education level 25 12.537 0.680 127.8** 0.061
Overall Schooling Rate 10.798 0.845 -274.8** 0.057
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) -2.861 0.686
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -0.909 0.478
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 9.135 0.156
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) -3.384 0.791
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 2.04*** 0.048
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 11.186 0.420
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -171.6** 0.051
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 3.665 0.846
Share pop. 0-10 -32.4* 0.107
Share pop. 11-20 -20.565 0.210
Share pop. 21-30 -0.298 0.971
Share pop. 31-40 5.028 0.751
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 25.150 0.223
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 30.1* 0.114
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 26.6* 0.119
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 30.5** 0.065
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coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -2.429 0.252 -3.856** 0.082 12.1** 0.058
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.871 0.687 0.992 0.613 -7.45** 0.056
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 2.015 0.503 1.425 0.632 11.4*** 0.017
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -1.339 0.448 -0.063 0.973 -10.4*** 0.009
School Attendence Rate (College) -7.06*** 0.003 -3.518* 0.140 -3.849* 0.141
Household Head Women (HH Women) 6.12*** 0.002 9.00*** 0.000 12.9*** 0.004
Illiteracy Rate -8.01*** 0.018 -5.899* 0.135 -5.026 0.277
Unemployment rate  -0.055 0.991 2.663 0.603 8.279 0.294
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.802 0.000 0.680 0.000 0.675
Education level 25 8.630 0.746 104.8*** 0.033
Overall Schooling Rate -39.9** 0.092 -146.4*** 0.014
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) -2.018 0.272
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -0.947 0.460
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 5.739 0.153
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 6.194** 0.067
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 0.584 0.623
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -3.331 0.474
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -8.250 0.918
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 6.176 0.605
Share pop. 0-10 -9.751 0.360
Share pop. 11-20 -20.2* 0.113
Share pop. 21-30 -14.1*** 0.017
Share pop. 31-40 -23.2*** 0.013
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 18.448 0.226
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 11.359 0.342
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years -7.365 0.452
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -8.358 0.453






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.204 0.230 0.340
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Map 8. Homicides and Adolescent Fertility Rates, by Municipality. 
 
       Source: 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
 
3.  Identifying the Channel Through Which the EAFR Affects the Homicide Rate 
 
Previous  paragraphs  give  us  support  to  the  argument  that  teen  young  mother  is  not  a 
necessary and sufficient condition to think that her children would be criminals in late teens 
and twenties. There might be channels through which adolescent fertility affect the homicide 
rate,  and  one  such  channel  might  be  the  lack  of  opportunities  children  born  from  an 
adolescent  mother  my  face.  Although  the  better  off  adolescent  women  might  not  be 
prevented from pursuing their former goals, and simultaneously, be able to care for their 
child, the possibility that those worse off could do so depend on the opportunities they and 
their children face. In order to assess whether children with lack of opportunities born from 
an  adolescent  mother  are  more  likely  to  become  criminals,  we  construct  an  interaction 
variable  with  effective  adolescent  fertility  rate  and  one  minus  the  secondary  school 
attendance rate lagged ten years, by census sector. Our hypothesis at this stage is that high 
adolescent  fertility  rates  twenty  years  ago  adjusted  by  migration  coupled  with  low 
enrollment rates in secondary ten years ago (when the children of young teen mother reach 
teen age), have negative effects on current homicides rates.
43 
 
It is important to notice that school attendance is not only limited by the availability of 
supply of schools, but also by potentially precarious care from mothers to their children. 
Krug et al. (2002) argue that ―Poor monitoring and supervision of children by parents and 
the use of harsh, physical punishment to discipline children are strong predictors of violence 
during adolescent and adulthood‖. Hawkins et al. (2000) analyzed studies related to ―risk 
and protective factors and the development of serious and violent juvenile offending careers‖ 
                                                           
43 This argument is in line with previous works that relate homicides and criminal activities with early dropping 
out of school by young teens. See the Literature Review section. 30 
 
and  conclude  that  poor  family  management  practices  and  child  maltreatment  are  good 
predictors of youth violence.
44 
 
Table 7 presents the difference-in-differences estimation of equation (1) using the effective 
adolescent fertility rate interacted with one minus secondary school attendance rate lagged 
ten years ( EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]) and controlling for the difference between men 
and women average age by cohorts of ten years (D1, D2, D3 and D4), excluding individual 
with more than fifty years. 
 
Results in Table 7 show that census sectors with higher school attendance rates, in secondary 
and college, and with higher proportion of adults in middle-ages, have lower homicide rates. 
On the other hand, homicide rates increase with the share of migrants from the Pacific and 
Antioquia  zones,  between  twenty  and  thirty  years  old.  The  results  also  show  that  the 
interaction variable is not significant in any of the specifications, leading us to consider 
alternative, or complementary, channels.
45 
 
Literature of risk of youth violence stress that peer influences and community factors in 
which young and adolescent live are important influence on their future criminal behavior. 
Krug  et  al.  (2002)  points  that  peer  and  community  influence  are  important  in  shaping 
interpersonal  relationships;  ―Having  delinquent  friends,  for  instance,  is  associated  with 
violence in young people‖ (Krug et al., 2002). For the Colombian case, Brook et al. (2007) 
stress that among adolescents, the environmental and neighborhood risk, accompanying with 
negative influences from the peer group, are consistently with violent activity.
46 
 
In order to capture the influence of the environment where young adolescent grew up, we 
construct a new interaction variable defined as: one minus secondary school attendance rate 
lagged ten years interacted with ―effective adolescent fertility‖ and the homicide rate lagged 
ten years ( EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 ). In addition of the consequences of the 
simultaneous occurrence of adolescent fertility and lack of opportunities, with this variable 
we expect to control for the ―environmental-peer effect‖. This approach seeks to capture the 
main hypothesis that literature has suggested of potential risk of youth violence. Those are: 









                                                           
44 Brook et al. (2007) present a psychiatric study that aim to explore the interrelation of domains of personality, 
familial, peer and ecological variables associated with violence, base on a survey to 1151 male adolescents 
selected  from  the  Colombian  cities.  They  found  that  low  parental  involvement  and  monitoring,  negatives 
influences from their peer group, and environmental risks, are related to violent activity.     
45  We performed some robustness check  (not reported here)  that tested wheter results changed once we 
dropped some census sectors located in downtown Bogotá. Results did not change. 
46 For more on this topic see Brook et al. (2003). 31 
 




Table 8 presents the results of difference-in-differences estimation of equation (1) using our 
new  interaction  variable  defined  in  last  paragraph,  and  our  pervious  controls.  In  this 
specification we find that sectors with high school attendance rates in secondary and college, 
and  with  high  proportion  of  adults  in  middle-ages,  have  lower  homicide  rates;  and  that 
homicide rates increase with the share of migrants from Antioquia, the Pacific and Central 
zones, between twenty and thirty years old. These results are similar to those found in our 
previous estimations. In this case, we additionally find that our new interaction variable is 
positive  and  significant  in  all  of the  specifications.  Moreover,  when  we  carry  out  some 
sensitive analysis as we made it previously, the coefficient of the interaction variable remain 
always significant at 5%.
47 It follows that it is not only adolescent fertility per se what 
implies a direct causal relation with crime, neither its jointly occurrence with lack of 
                                                           
47 See estimations presented in Table A2 
coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value Coef. p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  6.768 0.202 6.429 0.226 6.267 0.238 6.291 0.239
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -3.331* 0.109 -3.544** 0.092 -3.694** 0.080 -3.728** 0.078
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 0.648 0.667 0.640 0.679 0.853 0.578 1.067 0.492
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -2.90*** 0.032 -2.747*** 0.040 -2.85*** 0.035 -3.03*** 0.021
School Attendence Rate (College) -2.01*** 0.043 -2.026*** 0.039 -2.40*** 0.017 -2.76*** 0.014
Unemployment rate  0.855 0.818 1.047 0.781 1.522 0.686 1.887 0.620
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.273 0.000 0.278 0.000 0.199 0.000* 0.128
Overall Schooling Rate -39.04** 0.058 -13.834 0.152
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.211 0.782 0.400 0.601 0.557 0.469 0.609 0.432
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 0.107 0.787 0.107 0.791 0.163 0.680 0.218 0.566
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) -0.345 0.752 -0.320 0.775 -0.340 0.764 -0.372 0.738
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 4.10*** 0.039 4.086*** 0.039 4.06*** 0.039 4.04*** 0.039
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.03*** 0.018 1.057*** 0.015 1.12*** 0.009 1.16*** 0.007
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -3.419 0.313 -3.514 0.302 -3.507 0.306 -3.450 0.314
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) 18.939 0.679 13.603 0.764 12.391 0.786 14.083 0.758
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) -1.491 0.780 -1.211 0.820 -1.485 0.782 -1.908 0.725
Share pop. 0-10 1.814 0.569 3.600 0.265 5.454** 0.056 6.32*** 0.009
Share pop. 11-20 -2.522 0.455 -1.874 0.581 -0.656 0.834 0.195 0.939
Share pop. 21-30 -6.56*** 0.002 -6.548*** 0.001 -6.47*** 0.002 -6.39*** 0.002
Share pop. 31-40 -8.53*** 0.001 -7.662*** 0.001 -7.26*** 0.003 -7.34*** 0.002
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years -8.359 0.236 -9.281 0.174 -10.629* 0.114 -11.5** 0.093
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 2.172 0.660 3.114 0.537 3.632 0.473 3.632 0.471
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years -9.15*** 0.041 -8.564** 0.055 -8.83** 0.051 -9.40*** 0.038
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -12.8*** 0.017 -12.3*** 0.022 -13.4*** 0.012 -14.6*** 0.006
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] -0.179* 0.136 -0.173* 0.148 -0.165 0.165 -0.160 0.172
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] 0.161 0.852 0.058 0.947 -0.065 0.940 -0.130 0.876
Education level 25 24.162 0.182 -6.584 0.434
HH Women 4.56*** 0.000 4.47*** 0.000 4.31*** 0.000 4.19*** 0.000
Illiteracy Rate -1.513 0.320 -1.146 0.453 -0.989 0.512 -1.032 0.496






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.383 0.379 0.376 0.374
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
840 840 840 840
-4,489.50 -4,492.07 -4,494.54 -4,495.60
0.024 0.015 0.015 0.020
0.383 0.379 0.376 0.37432 
 
opportunities, as measured by school attainment, but their occurrence in an environment of 
crime, under which local criminals and gangs find it much easier to tempt teenagers to get 
involved in delinquency, leading them to become criminals. The result is robust and it is in 
line with what literature on youth violence have suggested. 
 
Note that both the adolescent fertility rate and the 10  years lagged homicide rates have 
negative coefficients. The sign of the adolescent fertility rate is less worrisome to the extent 
that as the triple interaction is capturing a positive effect, the isolated variable would be 
explaining what happens in census sectors with high adolescent fertility rates, but in which 
there are not simultaneously both low school attendance rates and high crime rates.  
 
Understanding the sign of the lagged crime rate is less straightforward, since we know that 
crime rates are very persistent in time. The negative coefficient of that variable might be 
biased due to measurement error though. Notice that since ours is a difference-in-differences 
estimation, the 1993 homicide rate appears both on the left hand side, when it is subtracted 
to the 2005 homicide rate, and on the right hand side, when we subtract to it the 1985 
homicide rate. That is, our model has the form 
 
with 
where  it h  is the true homicide rate, and 
*
it h  is the imperfect signal of the homicide rate that is 
actually observed, with measurement error vit. In our case, t is either 2005 or 1993, and t-1 is 
1993 and 1985 respectively. 
 
Borjas (1980) shows what happens in this case taking as example the use of cross section 
data to estimate a labor supply function in which the log of hours of work is explained as a 
function of the log hourly wage, and the hourly wage is constructed as the ratio of the 
monthly wage and the hours of work, a model which perfectly resembles the characteristic of 
ours. Borjas shows that in that case, the coefficient of the log hourly wage, in our case, of the 
differenced homicide rate, is biased towards minus one as the measurement error becomes 
larger. In that case, the estimate becomes 
2 2
2 2












h    is  the  variance  of  the  true  homicide  rate,  and 
2
v    is  the  variance  of  the 
measurement  error. Thus,  in  this  setting,  the  estimate  is  a  weighted  average  of  the  true 
coefficient and minus one. Levitt (1998) follows Griliches and Hausman (1986) to show that 
when the measurement error affects both the left-hand and right-hand side variables in a 
contemporaneous way, as it is our case, with panel data, the use of differentiation to remove 
the individual fixed effect makes the estimate to become 
  4
  2 it j it it it i it u h SE AFR h      
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*   333 
 
where the subscript j indicates that the panel model is estimated on the j
th differences, and 
j 
is the correlation between ht and ht-j. Here again, the estimate is a weighted average between 
the actual coefficient and minus one, although in this case the minus one is weighted more 
heavily for 0 >
j > 1. 
 
In our case, the variable measured with error appears in both sides of the equation, but it is 
lagged j periods on the right side, in our case, about ten years. It is straightforward to show 
that in the more general case with serial correlation in the vit‘s and the uit‘s, so that Cov(v) = 
  IN, and Cov(u) =   IN, uit = uit-1 + it, where both  and  are T x T matrices with all 
diagonal elements assumed equal, the expression for the estimated  becomes in our case 
 
With K = (1-)(1-
2j).  Here the bias has two main components, the first linked to the 
measurement error, v, and the second to the endogeneity of the lagged left hand side variable 
included on the right hand side of the equation, given the autocorrelation of the error term. 
The estimated coefficient, only under the presence of measurement error, would be again a 
weighted average, but in this case of the true  and minus (1-r
j)/2, where r
j is the correlation 
coefficient between vt and vt-j. Here in addition, we have another term that still biases more 
negatively the estimate. 
 
 
Table 8. Panel with FE with triple Interaction 
(EAFR*Education Gap*10 Years Lagged Homicide Rate), for Bogotá 
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To correct for measurement error we instrument the homicide rates of 1993 and 1985 with 
those  of  1985  and  1973  respectively.  The  results  of  the  estimation  that  corrects  for 
measurement error are reported in Table 9. Our triple interaction remains robustly positive 
across specifications, and additionally, our instrumented variable becomes insignificantly 
different from zero. The effective adolescent fertility, although still negative, is no longer 
robustly significant. The last two results might as well be driven by the relation between our 
effective adolescent fertility rate, and the lagged instrumented homicide rate, since now they 
become contemporaneous and thus, according to all our discussion from previous sessions, 
correlated. This might be preventing us from actually being able to reliably identify those 
coefficients. 
 
To give an idea of the magnitude of the effect of our interaction variable on the homicide 
rate,  we  estimate  de  standardized  coefficients  of  Table  9,  and  find  that  a  one  standard 
deviation increase in our triple interaction variable, would increase the homicide rate about 
0.36 standard deviations, a very significant amount. 
 
Table 9. Panel with FE with Interactions for Bogota and using IV for the 10 years lag 
of the Homicide rate 
coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -5.63*** 0.004 -5.76*** 0.004 -5.51*** 0.005 -5.61*** 0.005 -5.52*** 0.005
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -2.137 0.385 -2.160 0.381 -1.778 0.479 -1.886 0.458 -1.850 0.462
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 4.42*** 0.053 4.35*** 0.060 3.21*** 0.082 3.22*** 0.082 3.27*** 0.074
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -2.77*** 0.018 -2.58*** 0.029 -2.98*** 0.023 -2.87*** 0.029 -2.94*** 0.027
School Attendence Rate (College) -3.84*** 0.018 -3.89*** 0.018 -4.00*** 0.018 -4.01*** 0.018 -4.09*** 0.012
Unemployment rate  -2.680 0.569 -3.361 0.480 -3.398 0.478 -3.315 0.489 -3.258 0.495
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.176 0.000 0.167
Overall Schooling Rate 9.107 0.489 6.342 0.638 -9.918 0.615 5.558 0.674
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 1.012 0.213 0.969 0.202 0.891 0.213 1.012 0.175 0.983 0.183
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 1.03*** 0.061 1.07*** 0.047 1.07*** 0.046 1.07*** 0.047 1.08*** 0.041
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) -0.443 0.680 -0.404 0.700 -0.473 0.641 -0.461 0.655 -0.477 0.642
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 3.29*** 0.079 3.20*** 0.077 3.41*** 0.069 3.39*** 0.069 3.39*** 0.069
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.06*** 0.047 1.05*** 0.036 1.10*** 0.032 1.12*** 0.034 1.12*** 0.032
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -1.462 0.643 -1.222 0.678 -0.973 0.743 -1.029 0.731 -1.000 0.738
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -11.343 0.805 -12.863 0.774 -9.169 0.838 -12.415 0.783 -10.815 0.810
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 6.330 0.380 5.509 0.433 5.420 0.440 5.640 0.426 5.463 0.439
Share pop. 0-10 1.855 0.555 2.881 0.350 1.035 0.740 2.105 0.521 1.932 0.503
Share pop. 11-20 2.543 0.465 2.723 0.430 2.683 0.420 3.083 0.363 3.147 0.299
Share pop. 21-30 -6.30*** 0.024 -5.67*** 0.042 -5.89*** 0.038 -5.85*** 0.040 -5.83*** 0.040
Share pop. 31-40 -2.873 0.261 -2.240 0.373 -2.637 0.328 -2.080 0.407 -2.291 0.349
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years -6.134 0.392 -5.176 0.465 -4.199 0.559 -4.775 0.497 -4.794 0.503
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 1.755 0.783 3.283 0.593 3.037 0.634 3.554 0.574 3.332 0.588
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years -1.223 0.858 -0.098 0.989 -0.126 0.985 0.292 0.966 0.016 0.998
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -14.13*** 0.031 -13.08*** 0.045 -12.21*** 0.047 -11.89*** 0.053 -12.31*** 0.044
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 0.00*** 0.013 0.00*** 0.013 0.00*** 0.015 0.00*** 0.014 0.00*** 0.013
Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) -0.76*** 0.005 -0.75*** 0.007 -0.73*** 0.007 -0.74*** 0.007 -0.74*** 0.007
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] 0.018 0.979 -0.098 0.884 0.001 0.999 -0.039 0.953 -0.032 0.961
Education level 25 14.699 0.363 6.936 0.534
HH Women 3.31*** 0.009 3.35*** 0.009 3.29*** 0.010 3.28*** 0.008
Illiteracy Rate -2.294 0.316 -2.057 0.382 -2.141 0.371






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
(5)
843 843 843 843 843
(1) (2) (3) (4)
0.506 0.497 0.504 0.507 0.506
Variable
-4,615.56 -4,623.31 -4,617.49 -4,615.32 -4,616.04
0.137
0.497 0.504 0.507 0.506 0.506




Table 10 explores in detail each of the three possible double interactions between the three variables 
that compose out triple interaction. The first panel includes the double interaction between our access 
to secondary education and the estimated lagged homicide rate variables, the second between the 
EAFR and access to secondary variables, and the third between the EAFR and the estimated lagged 
homicide rate variables. 
 
The first panel shows a positive and significant coefficient on our EAFR variable and no significant 
coefficients on the other single and interaction variables, implying that the concurrence of lagged low 
access to secondary education and a high homicide rate do not contribute to explain current homicide 
rates.  In  the  second  panel  neither  the  EAFR  nor  the  other  single  or  the  interacted  variable  are 
significant.  Finally,  the  third  panel  shows  a  positive  and  significant  relation  of  the  interaction 
between the EAFR and the estimated lagged homicide rate. 
 
Altogether, the results imply that the positive effect between the EAFR and the homicide rate found 
in the first panel, would be explained by the census sectors that currently have individuals in the peak 
ages of crime who are very likely to have been born from an adolescent mother, and have lived in 
their teens in a neighborhood with a high homicide rate. Although the access to secondary education 
is important by itself, as it is negative and significant in all cases, we do not find evidence that it is 
not enough to become a channel through which individuals coming from an adolescent mother would 
be more likely to get involved in criminal activities. Only when these two characteristics concur with 
coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value Coef. p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -3.996 0.424 -4.393** 0.087 -4.824 0.336 -4.331* 0.107
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -5.732 0.280 -2.846 0.284 -6.293 0.232 -2.133 0.463
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 11.4* 0.106 3.050 0.273 10.9* 0.132
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -11.1*** 0.032 -3.73*** 0.024 -10.6*** 0.040 -4.06*** 0.028
School Attendence Rate (College) -2.421 0.377 -3.436 0.196 -1.451 0.573
Household Head Women (HH Women) 12.0*** 0.029 8.43*** 0.000 12.4*** 0.023 7.97*** 0.000
Illiteracy Rate 3.954 0.501 -3.258 0.353 4.330 0.479 -4.505 0.299
Unemployment rate  -7.779 0.417 1.463 0.769 -9.439 0.335 -0.614 0.900
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.553 0.000* 0.136 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.165
Education level 25 45.0 0.280
Overall Schooling Rate -23.2 0.640
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) -1.584 0.316 0.754 0.363 -1.461 0.360 1.152 0.202
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -0.977 0.369 0.319 0.536 -1.052 0.326 0.250 0.624
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 8.607** 0.053 0.770 0.622 8.764*** 0.048 0.445 0.750
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 5.463 0.306 4.429*** 0.030 5.848 0.285 4.958*** 0.031
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 0.611 0.771 1.113*** 0.025 0.637 0.764 1.166*** 0.017
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -3.148 0.581 -1.771 0.581 -2.950 0.602 -2.476 0.421
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -109.2 0.197 -9.183 0.852 -119.7 0.159 -15.5 0.755
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 9.683 0.535 8.844 0.360 11.687 0.453 8.844 0.358
Share women pop. 0-10 -3.852 0.681 -2.310 0.322 -1.526 0.860 -4.933** 0.068
Share women pop. 11-20 -10.2 0.437 0.524 0.889 -12.5 0.278 0.127 0.973
Share women pop. 21-30 11.7** 0.090 2.491 0.464 11.4* 0.084 2.802 0.398
Share women pop. 31-40 8.236 0.311 5.128** 0.079 7.810 0.210 8.308*** 0.039
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 46.9** 0.078 17.4* 0.117 45.8** 0.085 18.6* 0.129
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 19.0 0.264 9.876 0.343 21.7 0.215 10.2 0.363
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 16.9 0.198 0.998 0.901 18.4 0.160 3.209 0.673
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -13.7 0.561 -5.382 0.483 -8.715 0.679 -2.133 0.770
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 (Predicted) 2.6E-04*** 7.1E-05 9.1E-05** 0.059 2.7E-04*** 1.8E-05 9.3E-05** 0.051
Predicted Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) -0.414* 0.119 0.021 0.586 -0.417* 0.111 0.006 0.860
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] -0.468 0.839 -0.407 0.659 -0.610 0.790 -0.041 0.961






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.309
(1) (2) (3) (4)
853 843 853 843
-5,397.80 -4,746.42 -5,400.45 -4,757.56
Variable
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
0.398 0.327 0.394 0.309
0.398 0.327 0.39436 
 
a violent environment, we do find census sectors with higher homicide rates. This results highlights 
the importance of the environment in which the youth grows. 
 
Table 10 Panel with FE with Interactions 








coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
EAFR 9.80*** 0.043 6.544 0.660 -3.081 0.536
NBI -6.086 0.273 -5.915 0.247 -5.677 0.289
SAR (Primary) 12.44* 0.076 12.52* 0.079 11.34* 0.107
SAR (Secondary) -14.06* 0.005 -14.15* 0.008 -11.09* 0.034
SAR (College) -0.966 0.725 -0.926 0.743 -2.530 0.356
HH Women 12.14* 0.026 12.14* 0.030 11.60* 0.036
Illiteracy Rate 0.664 0.906 0.684 0.907 3.239 0.580
Unemployment rate  -9.343 0.336 -9.516 0.328 -6.899 0.471
Minority ethnic rate 0.001 0.277 0.001 0.264 0.000 0.456
Education level 25 65.97* 0.106 65.03* 0.102 45.38* 0.276
Overall Schooling Rate -30.80* 0.525 -28.48* 0.518 -24.51* 0.620
Share Residents (Atlantico) -0.618 0.680 -0.573 0.690 -1.560 0.321
Share Residents (East Zone) -0.522 0.644 -0.509 0.649 -0.940 0.389
Share Residents (Central Zone) 8.96* 0.049 8.96* 0.050 8.73* 0.052
Share Residents (Pacific Zone) 6.742 0.163 6.803* 0.149 5.242 0.323
Share Residents (Antioquia) 0.617 0.747 0.655 0.729 0.555 0.791
Share Residents (Valle) -3.953 0.455 -3.957 0.462 -3.513 0.540
Share Residents (San Andres and Providence Islands) -112.77* 0.192 -113.54* 0.191 -107.26* 0.205
Share Residents (Orinoquía Zone) 7.485 0.616 7.461 0.616 9.174 0.556
Share wpop. 0-10 -3.236 0.720 -3.704 0.668 -3.732 0.691
Share wpop. 11-20 -12.65* 0.337 -12.25* 0.322 -11.01* 0.402
Share wpop. 21-30 9.23* 0.191 8.95* 0.174 11.41* 0.100
Share wpop. 31-40 12.13* 0.157 12.70* 0.103 9.12* 0.263
D1 42.49* 0.125 42.43* 0.127 47.80* 0.074
D2 21.54* 0.218 21.47* 0.202 20.05* 0.238
D3 14.12* 0.267 14.16* 0.281 17.44* 0.186
D4 -10.52* 0.659 -10.70* 0.653 -13.22* 0.577
HR_L10(Predicted) -0.231 0.365 -0.231 0.311 -0.398* 0.126
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4.  Accounting for the Spatial Dynamics of Crime 
 
An important issue that we stood up in last paragraphs was the ―spatial‖ effect of urban 
crime.
48 In order to capture this spatial effect, we estimate spatial autoregressive panel with 
fixed effects following Elhorst (2009). The spatial lag model posits that the homicide rate at 
a specific census sector is a function of the homicide rates of the other census sectors of the 
city weighted by a function of the distance to them .  Thus, our previous model is now 
augmented with the Wh term, where W is a weighting matrix with zeros in its diagonal. The 
specification used takes the following form 
 
it i it jt
N
j




                                 (7) 
 
Where  it h  is the homicide rate for census sector i and time t,  ij w  is de i,j element of the 
spatial weights matrix W (Describing the spatial arrangement of the homicide), and Xit are 
all the control variables used in last regression
49. We use ML estimator proposed by Elhorst 
(2009) inspired in Anselin et al. (2006). Table 9 presents estimates of Fixed Effect Spatial 
Lag Model using the distance between the x,y coordinates of census sectors to construct the 
spatial weigh matrix and using the same specification that we use in the last regression, 
except that we use the age structure of women (Share wpop. 0-10, Share wpop. 11-20, Share 
wpop.  21-30  and  Share  wpop.  31-40)  by  census  sector  in  order  to  avoid  simultaneity 
problems with the age structure of men and homicide rates.
50 
 
Results presented in  Table 11  are similar to those presented in the last regression. The 
interacted variable (one minus secondary school attendance rate lagged ten years interacted 
with  ―effective  adolescent  fertility‖  and  the  homicide  rate  lagged  ten  years  (EAFR*[1-
SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10(Predicted) ) remains positive and significant at 5% in all of the 
specifications of the weight matrix. As previously expected, the 10 years lagged homicide 
instrumented rate becomes statistically non different  from zero, coercing its  former bias 
towards minus one. 
 
We also find that sectors with high school attendance in secondary and college rates and 
with high proportion of middle-women-adult age have low homicide rates. In this model we 
find that the homicide rate does not increase with high share of migrants from other zones, 
                                                           
48 The Moran‘s I-static of the last regression, using different specifications for W which we detail later, is 0.42 
with a p-value of 0.0023. 
49 We use different specification to construct W. Specifically we construct the spatial weigh matrix using the 
distance between the x,y coordinates of census sectors, using a distance between 900 to 1500 meters, then we 
row-normalized the resulting matrix W. Other specifications that we use for W are the n nearest neighbor, a 
row stochastic nearest neighbor and rook and queen contiguity.  
50 In the spatial lag model, stationarity requires that 
max min
1 1
w w    where wmin and wmax denote the 
smallest  and  largest  characteristic  root  of  W  matrix.  For  row-normalized  spatial  weights,  the  largest 
characteristic root is indeed +1, and the smallest bound is typically less than -1. (Elhorst, 2009). TableA3 and 
A4 present the results of estimates of Fixed Effect Spatial Lag Model using n-nearest neighbors and row-
stochastic nearest neighbor to construct spatial weight matrix respectively. 38 
 
except  in  some cases  for the Orinoquia zone.  Finally, the spatial  lag  variable is  always 
positive and statistically significant, meaning that increases in the homicide rate in a specific 
census sector spills over its neighboring census sectors. 
 
Table 11 Fixed Effect Spatial Lag Model with the triple Interaction 




We also perform other estimations using different configuration for the weigh matrix and 
find similar results from those presented in Table 11, in all cases finding that the interacted 
variable  remain  positive  and  significant  at  5%,  meaning  that,  census  sectors  with  lower 
secondary  school  attendance  rates,  higher  homicide  rates  ten  years  before,  and  higher 




                                                           
51  We perform Fixed Effect Spatial Lag Model (SAR), following Elhorst (2009) and the code provided by him. 
Coef. z-prob. Coef. z-prob. Coef. z-prob.
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -3.68*** 0.003 -3.68*** 0.003 -3.68*** 0.006
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.579 0.493 0.576 0.495 0.343 0.708
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 0.321 0.859 0.319 0.859 0.200 0.919
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -3.17*** 0.000 -3.17*** 0.000 -3.26*** 0.001
School Attendence Rate (College) -2.24*** 0.003 -2.25*** 0.003 -3.31*** 0.000
Education level 25 20.033 0.119 20.058 0.118 23.772 0.088
Household Head Women (HH Women) 6.20*** 0.000 6.20*** 0.000 6.86*** 0.000
Overall Schooling Rate -19.587 0.241 -19.613 0.240 -20.499 0.258
Illiteracy Rate -5.50*** 0.036 -5.50*** 0.036 -6.60*** 0.020
Unemployment rate  4.888 0.192 4.890 0.192 5.194 0.201
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.563 0.000 0.563 0.000 0.659
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.514 0.553 0.515 0.552 0.557 0.554
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 0.018 0.968 0.018 0.968 -0.036 0.942
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 0.728 0.438 0.729 0.437 0.883 0.386
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 2.958 0.130 2.963 0.129 3.688 0.082
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.81*** 0.034 1.81*** 0.034 1.58** 0.088
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 0.816 0.674 0.811 0.676 -0.554 0.792
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) 6.553 0.826 6.527 0.827 5.014 0.877
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 13.8*** 0.006 13.8*** 0.006 13.0*** 0.017
Share women pop. 0-10 -3.719 0.111 -3.722 0.111 -4.260 0.092
Share women pop. 11-20 -10.4*** 0.012 -10.4*** 0.012 -11.8*** 0.009
Share women pop. 21-30 -1.485 0.595 -1.491 0.594 -2.611 0.390
Share women pop. 31-40 -7.10*** 0.049 -7.10*** 0.049 -8.95*** 0.022
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 15.1*** 0.000 15.1*** 0.000 19.3*** 0.000
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 9.90*** 0.041 9.90*** 0.041 12.96*** 0.013
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 5.23** 0.080 5.24** 0.080 6.494*** 0.046
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 4.646 0.344 4.638 0.345 4.788 0.369
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 (Predicted) 2.0E-04*** 0.047 2.0E-04*** 0.047 1.8E-04** 0.092
Predicted Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) 0.113 0.375 0.113 0.375 0.129 0.351
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] -0.353 0.451 -0.353 0.451 -0.415 0.414
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5.  Discussion 
 
The robustness of our results can still be subject to additional tests. Here we will mention 
some issues that can be considered in future work, and provide a preliminary analysis of how 
they might be affecting our results. 
 
A first issue that arises is related to our empirical analysis, which does not include among the 
explanatory variables the homicides arrest rate. As it is explained by Levitt (1998), either 
through deterrence or incapacitation, homicides arrest rates might diminish the homicide 
rate. Whether that is the case in the case of Bogotá is an empirical question. Such question 
was assessed by Sánchez et al. (2003), who estimate a model to explain the homicide rate in 
the city as a function of several controls including the homicides arrest rate. Their model 
specification is very similar to the one adopted by Levitt (1998), nonetheless, they argue that 
in order to eliminate the endogeneity of the arrest rate, they rather explain the homicide rate 
at t as a function of the arrest rate at t-1. They find that an increase in the level of the 
homicides arrest rate of 0.1, would reduce the homicide rate 1.8 percent. 
 
Beyond the potential endogeneity that might still be present in the lagged homicides arrest 
rate, it is worth to assess how much their estimate would be subject to measurement error, 
and to what extent such potential problem might call into question the robustness of their 















1 ln ln , 
where Yit is the homicide rate, and Ait is the number of arrest. Under measurement error, we 
have that the observed homicide rate is a noisy signal of the true one,  it it it V Y Y 
* , where Vit is 
the  measurement  error.  Expressing  the  log  of  the  variables  in  lowercases,  the  model  to 
estimate, under measurement error, becomes it it it it i it v v a y            1
*
1
* . Following a 
similar procedure to the one presented by Levitt (1998), but now for the case of Sánchez et 
al. (2003), we find that under measurement error their estimated coefficient would be 
 
Where bw is the within estimator, 
2
a-y is the variance of the true homicides arrest rate, 
2
v is 
the variance of the measurement error, j and rj are the correlation coefficients of the true 
homicides arrest rates,  (a-y)t and (a-y)t-j, and the measurement error, vt and vt-j, respectively. 
Their estimated coefficient is then a weighted average of the actual coefficient and minus r1, 
the correlation coefficient between vit and vit-1. 
 
In light of the results presented above, which provide evidence of measurement error in the 
homicide rate, it seems then very likely that an exercise that corrected by measurement error 
could obtain a non statistically significant coefficient, implying that omitting the homicides 
arrest rates in our case, might not lead us to biased estimates. Note also that the bias leads to 
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a  coefficient  that  is  more  negative  the  higher  the  variance  of  the  measurement  error. 
Measurement error in the case of assaults larger than in the case of homicide rates would be 
consistent with Sánchez et al. (1998) results, which find a more negative coefficient of arrest 
rates in the case of assaults. 
 
This does not mean that homicides arrest rates in Bogotá do not have any effect on homicide 
rates, but rather that identifying such effect might be a challenge for several reasons. An 
important reason is that unlike the case in which the units of analysis are the cities, here they 
are different neighborhoods of one city. Important longitudinal variations in the homicides 
arrest rates for several neighborhoods might be consistent with constant homicides arrest 
rates in the whole city, and an increase in the homicides arrest rate in the city might be 
explained  by  the  dismantling  of  important  gangs  in  a  few  sectors  of  the  city,  having 
potentially a negligible effect on other sectors. 
 
Another important issue is related to the endogenous choice of the place of residence by 
households. Although this issue is not absent from previous work like that by Donohue and 
Levitt (2001), it would be expected to be more important in our case, since households‘ 
mobility within a city is more likely to happen more often than between states. Still, analyses 
like the one by Donohue and Levitt (2001) are as well subject to the fact that households 
face incentives that might lead them to consider moving from one state to another. Changes 
in  legislation,  or  existent  social  programs,  are  likely  to  imply  changes  in  the  incentives 
households face. Moffit (1992) review literature that shows that changes in welfare benefits 
offered by specific states might make low income potential beneficiaries move across them. 
Although work by Brueckner (2000) presents mixed evidence on this issue, more recent 
work  by  Fiva  (2007)  present  evidence  for  Norway  showing  that  potential  welfare 
beneficiaries actually move across different local governments. 
 
In the case of the United States, one could expect that programs like the Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), or the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
would provide incentives for teen mothers or their families to move to the neighboring states 
with more generous components of those programs. In our case, people might move as well 
endogenously  across  municipalities,  and  within  Bogotá,  responding  to  their  specific 
situations and incentives. The more important adolescent fertility could be for households to 
make  their  residential  choices,  the  more  difficult  it  would  be  to  identify  the  effect  of 
adolescent fertility on the homicide rate. Also, our ability to identify the effect of interest 
would be as well limited when the adolescents‘ characteristics that determine adolescent 
fertility are as well determinants of their residential choices. 
 
Medina  and  Tamayo  (2010)  assessed  the  determinants  of  the  probability  of  households 
changing  of  residence  from  one  census  sector  to  another,  controlling  for  a  battery  of 
covariates that included the presence of young teen mothers in the household. They found 
that, in a range of 6 to 8 years, the probability to change of residence is not affected by the 
presence  of  an  adolescent  mother  in  the  household.  This  probability  was  determined 
positively by the deficit of human capital, the marital status and the adolescent woman being 




They also found that the probability to move to a residence located in a census sector with a 
lower socioeconomic stratum was positively related to the absence of health insurance of 
adolescents in the household, and negatively related to the presence of an adolescent mother, 
the marital status of her parents, and the baseline socioeconomic stratum. When they assess 
the cases when households with adolescent women move to a better socioeconomic stratum, 
they found that this probability was not affected by the presence of an adolescent mother in 
the household. 
 
Those  results  call  for  caution  at  the  moment  of  getting  to  definite  conclusions  when 
interpreting our results. Accounting for the issues enumerated in this section is beyond the 
scope of this article and it is left for future work. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusions 
 
We review previous work that form part of a vast literature that argues that children born 
from adolescent mothers are more likely to become criminals in the future, and test that 
hypothesis using data of neighborhoods of Bogotá. 
 
We find that actually neighborhoods with high effective adolescent fertility rates and high 
crime rates at the moment the children of their teen mothers become teenagers, are more 
likely to have higher homicide rates in the future, when those children reach their peak crime 
ages, estimated to be between 18 to 26 years old in violent cities of Colombia. This happens 
regardless of whether individuals currently in their peak age crimes faced low access to 
secondary  enrollment  when  they  were  teenagers.  We  find  that  a  one  standard  deviation 
increase in our triple interaction variable (high effective adolescent fertility rate, high lagged 
homicide rate, and low lagged access to secondary schooling) would increase the homicide 
rate about 0.36 standard deviations, a very significant amount. 
 
Once controlling by our triple interaction variable that accounts for the effective adolescent 
fertility rate, and neighborhoods‘ schooling and crime rates, the effective adolescent fertility 
rate does not explain the homicide rate of the neighborhood, or if something, it becomes 
negatively related to it. Nonetheless, secondary enrollment keeps being negatively related to 
the  homicide  rate  of  the  neighborhood.  Thus,  although  access  to  secondary  schooling 
directly reduces the neighborhoods‘ homicide rate across various specifications, we find that 
for the effective adolescent fertility rate to affect the homicide rate, it would be required to 
take place simultaneously with a negative criminal environment, regardless of whether the 
individual faced low access to secondary when he was a teenager. 
 
This result is consistent with anecdotic evidence according to which the most vulnerable 
youths in poor neighborhoods of the main Colombian cities are bound to be either recruited, 
or threaten and potentially punished, by criminal gangs. Whether youths in these cases drop 
out of schools because of the criminal environment they live in, or they become engaged in 
that criminal  environment  because they previously dropped out,  is  an  open question we 
could not address. 
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Our results are robust to various specifications, including measurement error corrections, and 
the modeling of the spatial autocorrelation of the homicide rate. 
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Figure A1. Distribution of NBI, by Census Sector in Bogotá. 
 




Figure A2. Distribution of the Share of Female Headed Households by Census Sector is 
Bogotá. 
 
      Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
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Map A1. Migration from Antioquia to Bogotá, by Generation 
 
    Source: 1973, 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
 
Map A2. Migration from Central Zone to Bogotá, by Generation 
 


















Map A3. Migration from Pacific Zone to Bogotá, by Generation 
 
    Source: 1985, 1993 and 2005 Population Census (DANE) 
 
 
Map A4. Migration from Atlantic Zone to Bogotá, by Generation 
 








































coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value coef p-value
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -7.0*** 0.000 -6.9*** 0.000 -6.9*** 0.000 -6.8*** 0.001
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.849 0.738 1.213 0.640 1.213 0.640 1.106 0.669
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 4.1** 0.070 2.9* 0.139 2.86* 0.136 2.647 0.151
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -2.7*** 0.028 -3.2*** 0.019 -3.2*** 0.018 -3.2*** 0.019
School Attendence Rate (College) -3.0** 0.077 -3.1** 0.073 -3.1** 0.073 -2.9** 0.076
Unemployment rate  -2.154 0.664 -2.342 0.633 -2.340 0.636 -2.439 0.619
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.322 0.000 0.322
Overall Schooling Rate 24.4** 0.084 23.195 0.252 22.9** 0.099
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.867 0.243 0.920 0.205 0.919 0.209 0.821 0.250
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 0.762 0.156 0.771 0.156 0.771 0.157 0.786* 0.146
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) -0.155 0.878 -0.160 0.875 -0.161 0.873 -0.209 0.834
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 2.50* 0.137 2.69* 0.128 2.69* 0.127 2.75* 0.120
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 0.682* 0.114 0.775** 0.096 0.775** 0.094 0.767** 0.095
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -2.531 0.297 -2.321 0.345 -2.320 0.343 -2.184 0.376
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -0.509 0.990 1.209 0.976 1.259 0.975 3.846 0.923
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 5.619 0.435 6.060 0.400 6.054 0.402 5.929 0.408
Share women pop. 0-10 -5.8*** 0.022 -6.8*** 0.007 -6.8*** 0.007 -6.6*** 0.007
Share women pop. 11-20 -0.328 0.932 -0.891 0.812 -0.893 0.812 -1.570 0.673
Share women pop. 21-30 -0.041 0.989 0.176 0.951 0.182 0.948 0.667 0.811
Share women pop. 31-40 11.2*** 0.002 11.4*** 0.002 11.4*** 0.001 9.9*** 0.001
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 8.448 0.249 9.552 0.195 9.562 0.183 10.301 0.162
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 3.863 0.482 4.638 0.424 4.631 0.418 4.510 0.434
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 3.619 0.591 4.077 0.532 4.066 0.542 3.309 0.617
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -7.908 0.374 -5.650 0.481 -5.655 0.485 -5.029 0.527
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 8.7E-04*** 0.003 8.6E-04*** 0.003 8.6E-04*** 0.003 8.4E-04*** 0.004
Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) -0.820*** 0.001 -0.817*** 0.001 -0.817*** 0.001 -0.802*** 0.002
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] 0.568 0.472 0.688 0.369 0.688 0.371 0.742 0.334
Education level 25 -0.276 0.986 16.8* 0.140
HH Women 4.13*** 0.001 4.09*** 0.002 4.09*** 0.002 4.26*** 0.001
Illiteracy Rate -2.442 0.242 -2.447 0.259 -2.864 0.196






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.398 0.327 0.394 0.309
-4,068.16 -4,606.24 -4,206.25 -4,607.61
0.515 0.517 0.517 0.516
0.134 0.132 0.132 0.132
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
843 843 843 84353 
 
Table A2. Panel with FE with Interactions (Education and Homicide Rate Lagged 10 years) for Bogotá: Sensitivity to the 
Exclusion of Downtown Census Sectors 
 
 
coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -5.6*** 1.998 -5.7*** 1.983 -5.4*** 1.959 -4.4*** 1.802 -4.2*** 1.794 -4.4*** 1.801 -5.9*** 2.029
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) -2.280 2.570 -2.062 2.419 -1.849 2.420 -1.862 2.251 -1.928 2.264 -1.799 2.353 -1.998 2.538
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 4.382** 2.304 4.5*** 2.284 4.7*** 2.329 5.0*** 2.388 5.2*** 2.468 4.9*** 2.467 4.6*** 2.335
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -2.7*** 1.206 -2.7*** 1.170 -2.9*** 1.189 -3.3*** 1.106 -3.6*** 1.131 -3.1*** 1.108 -2.6*** 1.230
School Attendence Rate (College) -3.8*** 1.629 -3.8*** 1.619 -3.7*** 1.618 -4.1*** 1.682 -4.2*** 1.828 -4.1*** 1.759 -4.0*** 1.658
Unemployment rate  -2.557 4.724 -1.888 4.623 -1.604 4.632 -0.349 4.155 -2.215 4.314 -0.974 4.115 -1.636 4.736
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Overall Schooling Rate 8.667 13.5 10.059 13.0 10.7 13.0 11.910 12.9 12.615 13.1 12.937 13.4 10.950 15.1
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.960 0.807 0.921 0.794 0.672 0.735 0.579 0.683 0.653 0.691 0.236 0.633 0.913 0.812
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 1.020** 0.549 1.035** 0.545 1.071*** 0.541 0.902** 0.533 0.899** 0.546 0.896* 0.552 1.146** 0.666
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) -0.420 1.074 -0.378 1.067 -0.660 1.115 -0.226 1.063 -0.114 1.104 -0.553 1.174 -0.737 1.122
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 3.190** 1.828 3.242** 1.905 2.159 1.632 3.614** 1.975 3.735** 1.967 5.504* 3.489 3.113* 1.940
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.059** 0.543 1.139*** 0.529 1.195*** 0.513 1.092*** 0.518 1.107*** 0.533 0.560 0.510 1.127*** 0.538
Share Residents (Born in Valle) -1.567 3.169 -0.723 3.289 3.476 4.148 -2.154 3.192 -2.073 3.186 -2.286 3.040 -0.692 3.293
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -6.168 45.5 -34.660 41.4 -38.950 41.8 5.626 43.6 6.021 46.7 7.964 44.7 -34.897 42.1
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 7.459 7.452 8.056 7.073 7.823 7.483 -0.619 4.301 1.127 4.231 -2.827 5.166 7.982 7.448
Share pop. 0-10 1.876 3.224 1.789 3.123 1.566 3.114 2.846 2.800 2.450 2.893 3.160 2.835 2.182 3.412
Share pop. 11-20 2.606 3.507 2.292 3.463 2.893 3.504 1.712 3.448 1.486 3.478 1.660 3.452 2.313 3.906
Share pop. 21-30 -6.4*** 2.772 -6.3*** 2.763 -6.5*** 2.711 -6.9*** 2.666 -7.6*** 2.829 -6.4*** 2.640 -6.2*** 2.898
Share pop. 31-40 -3.146 2.640 -2.853 2.561 -3.050 2.567 -2.750 2.604 -2.924 2.690 -2.123 2.681 -3.041 2.689
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years -6.222 7.252 -6.718 7.138 -8.208 7.400 -8.479 6.949 -8.561 6.904 -6.555 6.814 -6.656 7.071
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 1.257 6.596 3.533 6.241 3.379 6.457 6.150 5.536 6.902 5.738 7.090 5.865 3.486 6.373
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years -1.015 6.814 -0.785 6.819 -0.835 6.925 -7.509* 4.764 -7.889* 4.831 -5.156 4.512 -0.638 6.819
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years -14.8*** 6.666 -14.6*** 6.520 -14.9*** 6.362 -15.6*** 6.203 -15.8*** 6.306 -14.8*** 6.332 -15.0*** 6.654
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 7.5E-04*** 0.000 7.4E-04*** 0.000 7.2E-04*** 0.000 6.3E-04*** 0.000 6.3E-04*** 0.000 6.1E-04*** 0.000 7.5E-04*** 0.000
Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) -0.752*** 0.277 -0.748*** 0.274 -0.729*** 0.290 -0.648*** 0.269 -0.644*** 0.267 -0.634*** 0.272 -0.749*** 0.275
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] 0.092 0.699 0.053 0.691 0.169 0.692 -0.448 0.578 -0.487 0.601 -0.303 0.580 -0.003 0.706






Note:  *** p<0.05, ** p<0.1, * p<0.15 (i) San Andres and Providence Islands
0.500
-4,591.49 -4,586.00 -4,529.76 -4,479.36 -4,321.32 -4,318.44 -4,398.02
0.493 0.498 0.480 0.502 0.507 0.490
0.500
0.138 0.048 0.069 0.130 0.128 0.139 0.051
0.493 0.498 0.480 0.502 0.507 0.490
(6) (7)
837 838 828 828 797 799 801
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)54 
 
Table A3. Fixed Effect Spatial Lag Model with Interactions (education and homicide 
rate lagged 10 years), Using IV, and using n-nearest neighbors to construct spatial 










coef. z-prob. coef. z-prob. coef. z-prob.
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -3.221 0.008 -3.672 0.003 -3.379 0.007
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.740 0.377 0.859 0.315 0.846 0.326
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 0.094 0.958 0.724 0.692 0.850 0.644
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -3.160 0.000 -2.955 0.001 -3.039 0.001
School Attendence Rate (College) -3.439 0.000 -3.019 0.000 -3.237 0.000
Education level 25 14.663 0.249 14.120 0.277 14.789 0.259
Household Head Women (HH Women) 6.063 0.000 5.834 0.000 5.486 0.000
Overall Schooling Rate -8.888 0.591 -8.566 0.612 -7.145 0.675
Illiteracy Rate -6.576 0.011 -5.669 0.032 -5.916 0.027
Unemployment rate  4.904 0.186 3.978 0.294 4.573 0.231
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.546 0.000 0.467 0.000 0.497
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.741 0.389 0.568 0.518 0.264 0.765
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) -0.156 0.730 -0.026 0.955 0.015 0.975
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 0.874 0.347 1.062 0.263 0.669 0.484
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 2.834 0.143 3.295 0.095 2.897 0.146
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.649 0.051 1.632 0.058 1.624 0.062
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 1.012 0.598 -0.288 0.883 1.192 0.547
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -2.467 0.933 -14.049 0.641 -10.201 0.737
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 11.534 0.021 14.968 0.003 15.269 0.003
Share women pop. 0-10 -3.969 0.086 -3.964 0.093 -4.012 0.092
Share women pop. 11-20 -7.223 0.079 -8.636 0.040 -8.950 0.035
Share women pop. 21-30 -1.830 0.509 -2.231 0.431 -2.467 0.388
Share women pop. 31-40 -5.792 0.104 -5.575 0.126 -6.894 0.060
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 17.698 0.000 18.196 0.000 17.295 0.000
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 10.128 0.035 11.484 0.019 11.078 0.025
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 4.811 0.105 5.736 0.058 5.780 0.059
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 3.218 0.509 3.616 0.467 2.755 0.583
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 (Predicted) 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.022
Predicted Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) 0.110 0.385 0.077 0.554 0.080 0.542
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] -0.803 0.084 -0.644 0.174 -0.526 0.271
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Table A4. Fixed Effect Spatial Lag Model with Interactions (education and homicide 
rate lagged 10 years), Using IV, and using row-stochastic nearest neighbor to 











coef. z-prob. coef. z-prob. coef. z-prob.
Effective Adolescent Fertility Rate (EAFR)  -3.423 0.009 -3.671 0.003 -3.255 0.011
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (NBI) 0.728 0.418 0.884 0.301 0.680 0.436
School Attendence Rate (Primary) 0.765 0.690 0.741 0.684 0.945 0.612
School Attendence Rate (Secondary) -3.012 0.001 -2.953 0.001 -3.104 0.001
School Attendence Rate (College) -3.288 0.000 -3.006 0.000 -3.035 0.000
Education level 25 18.412 0.177 13.871 0.285 15.771 0.234
Household Head Women (HH Women) 6.095 0.000 5.786 0.000 5.751 0.000
Overall Schooling Rate -10.701 0.546 -8.236 0.625 -9.684 0.574
Illiteracy Rate -6.260 0.024 -5.654 0.033 -6.003 0.026
Unemployment rate  5.707 0.152 3.949 0.297 5.213 0.177
Minority ethnic rate 0.000 0.791 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.531
Share Residents (Born in Atlantico) 0.199 0.829 0.562 0.521 0.259 0.772
Share Residents (Born in East Zone) 0.107 0.824 -0.027 0.954 0.159 0.734
Share Residents (Born in Central Zone) 0.557 0.576 1.063 0.262 0.534 0.581
Share Residents (Born in Pacific Zone) 2.978 0.151 3.262 0.098 2.198 0.276
Share Residents (Born in Antioquia) 1.482 0.102 1.637 0.057 1.726 0.050
Share Residents (Born in Valle) 1.955 0.343 -0.276 0.888 2.567 0.200
Share Residents (Born in S. A and P) (i) -10.204 0.747 -14.191 0.638 -7.366 0.811
Share Residents ((Born in Orinoquía Zone) 13.456 0.012 15.055 0.003 13.689 0.009
Share women pop. 0-10 -3.952 0.111 -3.950 0.094 -3.551 0.140
Share women pop. 11-20 -11.033 0.012 -8.576 0.041 -10.411 0.015
Share women pop. 21-30 -2.560 0.391 -2.205 0.436 -2.374 0.412
Share women pop. 31-40 -8.496 0.026 -5.506 0.130 -7.821 0.035
Difference Men-Women 0-10 years 16.739 0.000 18.109 0.000 16.016 0.000
Difference Men-Women 1-20 years 12.189 0.018 11.477 0.019 11.054 0.027
Difference Men-Women 21-30 years 6.905 0.030 5.725 0.059 6.588 0.033
Difference Men-Women 31-40 years 4.955 0.343 3.651 0.462 4.251 0.402
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10 (Predicted) 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.034
Predicted Homicide Rate lag 10 years (HR_L10) 0.105 0.441 0.075 0.560 0.093 0.481
[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10] -0.378 0.448 -0.648 0.171 -0.346 0.474
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Adolescent fertility rate AFR
Effective adolescent fertility rate EAFR
Unsatisfied Basic Needs NBI
School attendance rates in Primary SAR (Primary)
School attendance rates in Secondary SAR (Secondary)
School attendance rates in College SAR (College)
Numbers of years of study for people with more than 25 years Education level 25
Household head woman rates HH Women
Schooling rates of all of the population. Schooling Rate
Illiteracy Rate Illiteracy Rate
Unemployment rate  Unemployment rate 
Minority ethnic rate Minority ethnic rate
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Atlantico)  between 
twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (Atlantico)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (East Zone)  between 
twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (East Zone)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Central Zone)  between 
twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (Central Zone)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Pacific Zone)  between 
twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (Pacific Zone)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Antioquia)  between 
twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (Antioquia)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Valle)  between twenty 
and thirty years old
Share Residents (Valle)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (San Andres and 
Providence Islands)  between twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (San Andres and Providence Islands)
Share of residents (Who have lived for more than 5 years in that 
census sector) who born outside of Bogota (Orinoquía Zone)  
between twenty and thirty years old
Share Residents (Orinoquía Zone)
Share of the total population between 0-10 ten years Share pop. 0-10
Share of the total population between 11-20 ten years Share pop. 11-20
Share of the total population between 21-30 ten years Share pop. 21-30
Share of the total population between 31-40 ten years Share pop. 31-4057 
 
 
Share of the total women population between 0-10 ten years Share wpop. 0-10
Share of the total women population between 11-20 ten years Share wpop. 11-20
Share of the total women population between 21-30 ten years Share wpop. 21-30
Share of the total women population between 31-40 ten years Share wpop. 31-40
Difference between men and women average age, between 0-10 years D1
Difference between men and women average age, between 11-20 
years
D2
Difference between men and women average age, between 21-30 
years
D3
Difference between men and women average age, between 31-40 
years
D4
Effective adolescent fertility rate interacted with one minus 
secondary school attendance rate lagged ten years 
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]
One minus secondary school attendance rate lagged ten years,  
interacted with ―effective adolescent fertility‖ and the homicide rate 
lagged ten years
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10
Homicide rate lagged ten years HR_L10
One minus secondary school attendance rate lagged ten years,  
interacted with ―effective adolescent fertility‖ and the predicted 
homicide rate lagged ten years
EAFR*[1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]*HR_L10(Predicted)
Predicted homicide rate lagged ten years HR_L10(Predicted)
One minus secondary school attendance rate lagged ten years [1-SAR(Secondary)_L10]